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THE FIRING SQUAD AS “A KNOWN AND AVAILABLE
ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF EXECUTION” POST-GLOSSIP
Deborah W. Denno*
In the future . . . some inmates may suggest the firing squad as an
alternative [to lethal injection] . . . .1 [S]uch visible yet relatively pain-
less violence may be vastly preferable to an excruciatingly painful death
hidden behind a veneer of medication.2
INTRODUCTION
In Glossip v. Gross,3 the United States Supreme Court held 5-4
that three death row inmates failed to establish that the drug
midazolam created “a substantial risk of severe pain” when used as
the first of three drugs in Oklahoma’s lethal injection procedure.4
Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito explained that the
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1. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2796 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 2797.
3. Id. at 2796. Justice Samuel Alito announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered an opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas joined. Id. at 2730–46. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opin-
ion, which Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 2746–50. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion,
which Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 2750–55. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2755–80. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Elena Kagan joined. Id. at
2780–97.  For an excellent discussion of the controversial complications that preceded the
Court’s granting of certiorari in Glossip, see Eric Freedman, No Execution if Four Justices Object,
43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639 (2015) (analyzing the repercussions that occur in capital cases when
four voting Justices are needed to grant a certiorari petition but five voting Justices are re-
quired to stay an execution).
4. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (affirming the rulings of the Oklahoma District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit).
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evidence presented from both sides supported the district court’s
view: “midazolam can render a person insensate to pain”5 and peti-
tioners had failed to demonstrate midazolam’s inadequacy under
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.6
In addition, the Court provided “two independent reasons” to af-
firm the district court’s determination:7  first, petitioners could not
“identify a known and available alternative method of execution
that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth Amend-
ment method-of-execution claims,”8 and second, they were unable
to show that the district court committed clear error in rejecting
petitioners’ arguments.9
The Court’s rationale concerning alternative methods of execu-
tion potentially represents Glossip’s broadest impact. Even though
Richard Glossip’s fate remains unknown10 and the case’s striking
dissents captured much of the legal and media commentary,11 this
Article focuses on how Glossip may serve as Eighth Amendment pre-
cedent. Such an objective is particularly timely given states’ ongoing
frustrations in finding lethal injection drugs, despite the Court’s ap-
proval of midazolam.12
Glossip is the second of two Supreme Court cases concerning le-
thal injection drugs decided in close succession.13  In the first case,
Baze v. Rees,14 the Court held, in a highly splintered 7-2 decision
5. Id. at 2741 (“Based on the evidence that the parties presented to the District Court,
we must affirm. Testimony from both sides supports the District Court’s conclusion that
midazolam can render a person insensate to pain.”).
6. Id. at 2731. The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
7. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731.
8. Id. (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008) (plurality opinion)).
9. Id.  For an excellent critique of the Glossip Court’s use of the “clearly erroneous”
standard of review, see David L. Faigman, The Supreme Court’s Confused Empirical Jurisprudence,
15 EXPERT EVID. REP. (Bloomberg BNA), July 6, 2015, at 303.
10. See, e.g., Glossip v. State, No. D-2005-310, at 1-2 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2015)
(order issuing stay) (noting that Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin issued a stay of execution
for Richard Glossip and two other inmates because the Oklahoma Department of Correc-
tions received an order of potassium acetate instead of the requisite drug of potassium
chloride, which is “contrary to the written protocol,” and the State needs “an indefinite pe-
riod of time . . . to evaluate the events that transpired on September 30, 2015”).
11. Deborah W. Denno, Symposium: “Groundhog Day” Indeed, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30,
2015, 2:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-groundhog-day-indeed/;
see also infra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Glossip dissents).
12. See Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
lethal-injection (last visited May 4, 2016) (reviewing the ongoing developments with lethal
injection, most particularly the shortage of appropriate drugs).
13. See infra notes 14–21 and accompanying text.
14. 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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with a plurality opinion,15 that Kentucky’s use of a three-drug proto-
col, the most common lethal injection procedure in 2008, satisfied
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.16
Defendants had failed to demonstrate that the protocol posed a
“substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of “serious harm”17
compared to “known and available alternatives.”18 The three-drug
protocol at issue in Baze consisted of the following:  sodium thio-
pental, a barbiturate anesthetic that brings about deep
unconsciousness; pancuronium bromide, a total muscle relaxant
that paralyzes all voluntary muscles and causes suffocation; and po-
tassium chloride, a toxin that induces irreversible cardiac arrest.19
According to Baze, states using “substantially similar” protocols
would be on constitutionally safe ground.20 As a result, many ob-
servers of the death penalty anticipated that Baze would quell
execution method challenges.21
Glossip’s credibility rests on the belief that Baze “cleared any legal
obstacle to the use of [this]  three-drug protocol.”22 Yet there is no
basis for that belief, quite the contrary.  The three-drug protocol at
issue in Baze is no longer viable due to ongoing and unpredictable
shortages of lethal injection drugs during the years following the
Court’s decision.  Indeed, these shortages have created far more lit-
igation and upheaval than the wide range of lethal injection
challenges that preceded Baze.23 The litigation has also targeted two
developments: first, the continual efforts by departments of correc-
tions to seek never-tried lethal injection drugs and protocols and
15. Id. at 40–63.  Chief Justice John Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion in which Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito joined. Id. Justice
Alito filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 63–71. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Id. at 71–87. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Id. at 87–93. Justice Thomas filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 94–107. Justice Ste-
phen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 107–13. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice David Souter joined. Id. at 113–23.
16. Id. at 41.
17. Id. at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 61.
19. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1333-34
(2014) [hereinafter Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos].
20. Baze, 553 U.S. 35 at 61.
21. For an analysis of the different opinions in Baze, see generally Deborah W. Denno,
For Execution Methods Challenges, the Road to Abolition Is Paved with Paradox, in THE ROAD TO
ABOLITION? THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 183 (Charles J. Ogle-
tree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009) [hereinafter Denno, Paved with Paradox].
22. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733.
23. See Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1346–81.
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second, a series of widely publicized botched executions, a dispro-
portionate number of which have involved the use of midazolam.24
Overall, then, states have adopted wholly inappropriate drug substi-
tutes to keep executions going despite risky and chaotic results.25
Glossip is the Court’s effort to review yet another lethal injection
protocol a mere seven years after Baze.26
This Article does not address the medical debate surrounding
the role of midazolam in executions; the problems associated with
using the drug have been persuasively argued elsewhere.27 Nor does
it question the soundness of the Glossip Court’s “alternative method
of execution” requirement.28 Rather, this Article’s proposed reform
is a constitutionally acceptable alternative that meets the Glossip
Court’s standard, rendering moot—at least for the purposes of the
following discussion—very real concerns regarding the validity of
that dictate.29
Part I of this Article pinpoints several areas where the Glossip
Court goes wrong in glaringly inaccurate or misleading ways, given
the vast history and literature on execution methods and their
24. See Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, supra note 12 (detailing the ongo-
ing litigation over lethal injection and the use of new and never-used lethal injection drugs as
well as botched lethal injection litigation).
25. See generally Ty Alper, The United States Execution Drug Shortage: A Consequence of Our
Values, 21 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 27 (2014); Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at
1346–82; Seema K. Shah, Experimental Execution, 90 WASH. L. REV. 147 (2015).
26. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2731 (citing to the Eighth Amendment precedent of Baze).
27. Id. at 2780–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Petitioners at 28–38, Glos-
sip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955) (explaining how and why the substitution
of midazolam for barbiturates creates the objectively intolerable risk prisoners will experi-
ence excruciating pain and suffering during their executions); Brief for the Louis Stein Ctr.
for Law and Ethics at Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Glossip v. Gross at 12–25, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955) (noting that the three-drug
lethal injection protocol, developed in 1977 in Oklahoma and later adopted nationwide,
lacked an adequate medical or scientific basis and that state prison officials have continued
to pursue this same experimental pattern with other lethal injection drugs, including midazo-
lam);  Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4–15, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-
7955) (asserting that the lack of a scientific or medical consensus that midazolam alone can
reliably prevent petitioners from experiencing significant pain renders it a constitutionally
unacceptable anesthetic). For further discussion of Glossip in the context of the problems
with midazolam and lethal injection drug experimentation, see generally Paul Litton, On the
Argument that Execution Protocol Reform is Biomedical Research, 90 WASH. L. REV. Online 87
(2015).
28. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (noting that petitioners could not “identify a known and
available alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement of
all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims”).
29. I agree with Justice Sotomayor’s criticism of the Court’s stance on the “known and
available alternative” requirement. See id. at 2792–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  For a
clever discussion of the contradictions arising during oral arguments in Glossip that bear on
this alternative method requirement in the context of risks of severe pain, see Sherry F. Colb,
The Appearance and Reality of Cruelty in Glossip v. Gross, VERDICT (May 19, 2015), https://
verdict.justia.com/2015/05/19/the-appearance-and-reality-of-cruelty-in-glossip-v-gross.
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changes from the nineteenth century through the start of the
twenty-first century. Part II analyzes the Court’s “known and availa-
ble alternative method of execution” standard as defined by both
the majority opinion and Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent. Part III
proposes that the firing squad is the most viable “known and availa-
ble alternative” that meets the delineations, however meager,
outlined by the Court. Indeed, the firing squad is the only current
form of execution involving trained professionals, and it delivers a
swift and certain death.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent touches on sound and convincing
reasons why death row inmates considering the hazards associated
with lethal injection may prefer the firing squad as an alternative
method of execution.30 This is not the first time that an argument
for the firing squad has been made in recent years.31 But previous
justifications have primarily occurred before Glossip and within the
confines of other cultural or doctrinal delineations of the Eighth
Amendment.32 Glossip’s “alternative method” requirement adds yet
30. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
31. See Alexander Vey, Note, No Clean Hands in a Dirty Business: Firing Squads and the
Euphemism of “Evolving Standards of Decency,” 69 VAND. L. REV. 545 (2016); Andrew Jensen
Kerr, Facing the Firing Squad, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 74 (2015); Deborah W. Denno, Kill Lethal
Injection and Bring Back the Firing Squad, TIME  (Apr. 28, 2015), http://time.com/3831515/
execution-lethal-injection-supreme-court/. For discussions of the history and nature of the
firing squad within the context of other methods of execution, see Deborah W. Denno, Is
Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineering of Death over the Century, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 551, 687–89 (1994) [hereinafter Denno, Engineering of Death]; Deborah
W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 348–98 (1997)
[hereinafter Denno, Getting to Death].
32. See Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The firing squad strikes me as the most promising
[method of execution].”); ROBERT BLECKER, THE DEATH OF PUNISHMENT: SEARCHING FOR JUS-
TICE AMONG THE WORST OF THE WORST 181 (2013) (favoring the firing squad over lethal
injection because shooting resembles and represents a real punishment rather than a medi-
cal procedure); P. Thomas DiStanislao, A Shot in the Dark: Why Virginia Should Adopt the Firing
Squad as Its Primary Method of Execution, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 779, 782 (2015) (contending that
the state of Virginia should replace its current form of lethal injection execution with the
firing squad because it is “a more effective means of execution”). For a thorough and inform-
ative overview of the history and use of the firing squad, see Christopher Cutler, Nothing Less
Than the Dignity of Man: Evolving Standards, Botched Executions and Utah’s Controversial Use of the
Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 338–63 (2002–2003). Two post-Glossip publications
have endorsed the firing squad in the context of Glossip: Vey, supra note 31, at 545; Kerr,
supra note 31, at 74. Vey examines the firing squad as an alternative method of execution as
well as an expression of state power to counter this country’s euphemistic use of lethal injec-
tion as a punishment that looks like a medical procedure to soften the reality of state
executions. Vey, supra note 31, at 575–84. Kerr effectively argues that the firing squad is more
consistent with the government’s goals of retribution and dignity, especially given all the
challenges associated with lethal injection.  Kerr, supra note 31, at 76–86.
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another dimension to execution method challenges and it strength-
ens the seriousness and acceptability of the firing squad as an apt
means of execution.
Justice Sotomayor is the first Justice to proactively and favorably
compare the firing squad—or any other execution method—to le-
thal injection, albeit briefly.33 Although legal commentators and the
news media have all but bypassed Justice Sotomayor’s firing squad
comments,34 her compelling analysis highlights the extent to which
she questions the lethal injection process.35 This Article further po-
sitions the role of the firing squad in the context of the Court’s
latest Eighth Amendment decision on execution methods. It also
suggests a reform that may have some traction in light of states’
ongoing challenges in securing acceptable lethal injection drugs.
I. SOME WRONG TURNS IN GLOSSIP
Glossip follows Baze as the Court’s most recent decision on execu-
tion methods. Yet the Glossip Court’s analysis is extraordinarily
scant. Two primary examples of this deficiency are the way the
Court examines the history of changes in execution methods over
time, and the Court’s explanation of why and how Oklahoma
adopted lethal injection. Equally problematic is the Court’s focus
on “anti-death-penalty advocates” as the basis for states’ current
problems with lethal injection36 because the argument ignores the
reasons behind the extensive litigation that led to Glossip.
33. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Baze plurality
considered the firing squad among the least modern methods of execution: “Our society has
nonetheless steadily moved to more humane methods of carrying out capital punishment.
The firing squad, hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber have each in turn given
way to more humane methods, culminating in today’s consensus on lethal injection.”  Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 (2008) (plurality opinion).
34. Two legal commentators mentioned Justice Sotomayor’s take on the firing squad but
only briefly and in the context of other types of arguments. See Vey, supra note 31, at 579
(noting Justice Sotomayor’s view toward the firing squad as an invitation to litigating law-
yers); Kerr, supra note 31, at 84 n.74 (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s perspective on the
humaneness and efficiency of the firing squad).  Two news articles discussed the matter but
only in passing in the context of analyzing Glossip in general. See Ed Pilkington, Controversial
Oklahoma Lethal Injection Drug Approved by US Supreme Court, THE GUARDIAN, (June 30, 2015,
10:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/29/midazolam-supreme-court-
oklahoma; Barbara Leonard, Supreme Court Upholds Execution Protocol Likened to Burning Alive,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, (June 29, 2015, 8:32 AM) http://www.courthousenews.com/
2015/06/29/supreme-court-upholds-execution-protocol-likened-to-burning-alive.htm.
35. See infra notes 168–183 and accompanying text.
36. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733.
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A. Glossip’s Misuse of History
For a topic as vast, historic, and significant as how this country
executes its death row inmates, the Glossip Court spends remarkably
little time explaining the past. In less than two pages, the Court
reviews changes in the United States’ five execution methods over
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from hanging to electrocu-
tion to lethal gas to the firing squad and, finally, to lethal
injection.37 Yet at no time during this brisk review does the Court
explain why states switched their methods of execution, except to
say that each new method was “the most humane” (or words along
those lines) relative to the method it replaced.38 In addition, the
Court mentions that each state’s introduction of a new method ren-
dered that new method constitutional.39
The complete history of execution method transitions, however,
is far more extensive than the Glossip Court suggests.  That history is
replete with detailed accounts at the legislative, judicial, and correc-
tional levels that explain why each new method failed so profoundly
in its goal to be more humane than the method it replaced.40 Hang-
ing, lethal gas, and electrocution were adopted and initially used
with great fanfare only to be criticized and replaced after decades
of technical failures and botched executions.41 As a result, lethal
37. Id. at 2731–32.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. For detailed and documented overviews of these switches over the past two centuries
for all death penalty states, see Denno, Engineering of Death, supra note 31, at 687–89; Denno,
Getting to Death, supra note 31, at 348–98; Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary:
How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 51–101 (2007) [herein-
after Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary]; Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death:
The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About
Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 90–141 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, When Legislatures Delegate];
Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1333–34. For further discussion, see also
SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, THE LAST GASP: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN GAS CHAMBER
(2010) (providing a tour-de-force history of the gas chamber in the United States in the
context of developments in national and international science, politics, and culture); AUSTIN
SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY (2014)
(analyzing all documented botched executions from 1890 to 2010); Eric Berger, Lethal Injec-
tion Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367 (2014) (discussing the
constitutional implications of lower federal courts continually dismissing death row inmates’
efforts to garner critical information about their lethal injection protocols); James Gibson &
Corinna Lain, Death Penalty Drugs and the International Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. 1215 (2015)
(examining the link between the efforts of European governments and the increasing
shortage of lethal injection drugs); Shah, supra note 25, at 147 (criticizing the use of experi-
mental executions involving death row inmates as a result of the lethal injection drug
shortage and correctional officials’ attempts to substitute inappropriate drugs in lethal injec-
tion protocols).
41. For an overview of how hanging, lethal gas, and electrocution were initially hailed as
successes only to be later deemed failures, see Denno, Engineering of Death, supra note 31;
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injection, the latest method, is now used almost exclusively.42 But
this record of exclusivity is no victory for lethal injection. Regardless
of the outcome in Glossip, lethal injection’s dominance demon-
strates only that other methods have failed. States seem to have
exhausted alternative methods of execution, apart from changing
the drugs and procedures of lethal injection itself.
The Court’s brevity is not confined to recounting this country’s
changes in execution methods. For example, the Court explains
that lethal injection was first enacted following a nine-year hiatus in
capital punishment in the United States, spanning from 1967 to
1976; yet, the Court never mentions why the hiatus occurred.43 Ac-
cording to historical accounts, however, starting in the 1960s, a
number of legal organizations and advocates expressed concern
about the degree of discretion that existed in the application of the
death penalty, particularly among sentencing juries, and the result-
ing risk of arbitrariness, such as race discrimination.44  Such groups
made a strategic decision to halt all executions by way of strong and
concerted legal challenges in all cases in which an execution
seemed likely.  The groups believed that a country that was execu-
tion-free could finally start to understand why the death penalty was
no longer necessary.45  As Michael Meltsner explains, “[i]t is not
easy to trace the evolution of this change in policy, for it came
about only after a number of complex, interrelated, tactical and
moral considerations coalesced, but of its importance there can be
no doubt.”46
This execution ban, which started in 1967, thereby prompted an
unofficial “de facto” moratorium on the application of the death
penalty.47  Such a hiatus would be perpetuated some years further
Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31; Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 40, at
51–101; Denno, Paved with Paradox, supra note 21; Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra
note 40, at 90–141; Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1333–34.
42. See generally Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1333–34 (documenting
how death penalty states turned to lethal injection either exclusively or as a choice method);
see Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, supra note 12 (providing the current status
of lethal injection).
43. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2728.
44. For a discussion of how these groups came together see WILLIAM J. BOWERS, GLENN
L. PIERCE & JOHN F. MCDEVITT, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
1864–1982 at 15–18 (1984); DANIEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 106–08 (1973); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The
Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 COLO. L. REV. 1, 11–15 (2002).
45. See MELTSNER, supra note 44, at 106–25; see also Kirchmeier, supra note 44, at 11–15
(discussing the moratorium strategy).
46. MELTSNER, supra note 44, at 106.
47. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 24 (H. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (explaining that
“[t]he de facto moratorium on executions [was] created in 1967 by the litigational efforts of
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund”); MELTSNER, supra note 44, at 106–08
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by the Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia.48  In Furman and
related cases, the Court held 5-4 that the imposition of the death
penalty in the cases before it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.49  Because Furman comprised a per curiam decision
of just one paragraph along with nine separate opinions,50 however,
the case had no singular message.51 That said, the opinions indi-
cated that most of the Justices were troubled by the degree of
discretion given to sentencing juries along with the resulting arbi-
trariness in death-sentencing decisions.52 While Furman was aimed
toward striking down the procedures in Georgia and Texas, it en-
ded up having a broad effect, essentially invalidating nearly every
death sentencing system of every jurisdiction in the country.53
1. The Impact of Gregg v. Georgia
This stalemate, however, would quickly change four years later.
In 1976, the Court decided Gregg v. Georgia,54 holding that the death
penalty is not per se a cruel and unusual punishment and that the
guided discretion approach that many states had since adopted sat-
isfied Eighth Amendment requirements.55 Within seven months of
the Court’s decision, Utah executed Gary Gilmore by firing squad,56
(describing the tactical forces at work); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 18 (1991) (noting that the last execution before the hiatus began was that of Louis
Jose Monge on June 2, 1967).
48. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
49. Id. at 239–40.
50. Id.
51. Kirchmeier, supra note 44, at 15 (noting that Furman had “no clear consensus”);
Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (“[O]ne cannot
help but wonder if the [Furman] Justices’ inability to agree on a doctrinal basis for their
ruling was due to the fact that one simply did not exist.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 362  (1995) (“The opinions [in Furman] presented a stag-
gering array of arguments for and against the constitutionality of the death penalty and
offered little means, aside from shrewd political prediction, of determining which arguments
would dominate in the decision of any future cases.”).
52. Kirchmeier, supra note 44, at 15; Lain, supra note 51, at 6–7; Steiker & Steiker, supra
note 51, at 366–71.
53. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  For an earlier discussion of
the impact of Furman, see Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The
Eighth Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62 (1973).
54. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
55. Id. at 187.
56. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 18; see also infra notes 267 and 314 (discussing the
execution of Gary Gilmore).
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thereby revitalizing this country’s death penalty and ending a mora-
torium that had lasted nearly ten years.57
With Gregg the United States immediately had to grapple with the
problem of how states were going to execute their death row in-
mates.  Such a quandary appeared to spur an interest in a new
execution technique for three primary reasons. First, states had en-
countered highly publicized problems and botched executions with
the prior procedures, most particularly electrocution and lethal gas,
and there were concerns about going back to them. Second, a pub-
lic interest developed in the potential for having executions
televised, in which case states would need a method that could ap-
pear humane and palatable to a viewing audience. Third,
legislatures were troubled by the cost of refurbishing the electric
chair and gas chamber and searched for the possibility of a cheaper
method. Thus, lethal injection seemed to be the solution to all
three issues: the method was billed as humane and botch-free, and
the drugs recommended for an injection were far cheaper than
electrocution or lethal gas.58  While some form of injecting a deadly
toxin into inmates had been considered as early as 1888 in this
country and then decades later in Great Britain, Gregg fueled a ris-
ing interest in finally applying such an injection method.59 In 1977,
one year after Gregg, Oklahoma both created and adopted the
three-drug protocol that would later dominate all lethal injection
executions.60
The Glossip Court never explains why the United States turned to
a new method of execution in 1976 over what had been the most
popular method pre-Gregg—electrocution.61 The Glossip Court men-
tions that Oklahoma “eventually settled” on the types of drugs that
would be included in the protocol:62 sodium thiopental,
pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.63 But the Court
does not explain the process behind the method’s adoption, which
was exceptionally quick and slapdash: in late 1976, Jay Chapman,
the Oklahoma Medical Examiner, and Bill Wiseman, an Oklahoma
legislator, devised this three-drug method along with a draft of the
57. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31, at 373–74 (discussing these three
rationales).
59. Id.
60. See infra notes 61–66.
61. See generally Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31, at 373–75 (explaining the reasons
why states turned to lethal injection as a new method of execution).
62. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015).
63. See supra note 19.
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lethal injection statute itself within the course of a day.64 By March
1977 the Oklahoma legislature intensely debated the wisdom of
adopting Chapman’s and Wiseman’s lethal injection method and
statute. According to reported accounts, the legislators believed
that even if they approved the Chapman-Wiseman method, it would
be replaced by newer and more appropriate drugs before it was
ever actually used on any inmates.65 Little did anyone know that
after Oklahoma adopted the Chapman-Wiseman method in 1977,
the same three-drug protocol would survive into the twenty-first
century and dominate the execution process. In 2010, states started
to change the Chapman-Wiseman protocol only because they could
no longer procure the first of the three drugs.66 The Glossip Court
wholly ignores this critical backdrop, however, as it matter-of-factly
describes Oklahoma’s creation and adoption of lethal injection in
just one paragraph.67
The Glossip Court also states that the Court “has never invalidated
a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”68 That characteri-
zation is technically correct. But it is only part of a much longer
story that the Court does not tell. Until 2008, in Baze v. Rees,69 the
Court had never reviewed evidence concerning whether any
method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.70 Legislative changes in execution
methods during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however,
demonstrate that states typically change their method of execution
when they perceive that their current method is vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge.71 Indeed, in Bryan v. Moore,72 the Court
granted certiorari to review arguments concerning whether electro-
cution, as carried out in Florida, violated the Eighth Amendment at
a time when Florida used only electrocution and no other
64. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandry, supra note 40, at 65–70 (2007) (describing the
creation of the protocol and the statute based on author’s interviews with Jay Chapman and
Bill Wiseman).
65. For an extensive overview of this history, see id. at 51–101.
66. See generally Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1333–34 (discussing the
reasons for that change in the original Chapman-Wiseman protocol).
67. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732.
68. Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted).
69. 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion).
70. Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31, at 371.
71. See Denno, Engineering of Death, supra note 31, at 687–89; Denno, Getting to Death,
supra note 31, at 348–98; Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1333–34; Denno,
Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 40, at 51–101; Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra
note 40, at 90–141.
72. 528 U.S. 960 (1999), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000).
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method.73 The Court dismissed this grant as improvidently granted,
however, because the Florida legislature subsequently enacted a
statute that would allow an inmate to choose lethal injection as an
alternative execution method.74  The legislature’s decision thereby
enabled petitioners to forego using electrocution entirely.
California’s employment of lethal gas further illustrates the com-
plexities of this type of maneuver.  In 1996, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held, in Fierro
v. Gomez,75 that execution by lethal gas violated the Eighth Amend-
ment even though the plaintiffs, San Quentin death row inmates,
had the option of choosing lethal injection.76  At that time, if in-
mates waived their right to choose the method by which they would
be executed, the statute specified they would be executed by lethal
gas.77  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the
Fierro district court’s decision, concluding that California’s statute
authorizing execution by lethal gas is unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual.78
The Ninth Circuit’s determination in Fierro was groundbreaking,
marking the first time in this country’s history that a federal appeals
court had held any method of execution unconstitutional.79  Soon
thereafter, the Court granted certiorari to review the merits of the
Ninth Circuit’s holding,80 but the California legislature rapidly
moved to preclude the possibility that the Court could strike down
its execution method statute.  Like the Florida legislature’s actions
preceding Bryan v. Moore,81 the California legislature changed its
statute so that those inmates who failed to choose between lethal
gas or lethal injection would now be executed by lethal injection.82
As a result, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s holding that lethal
gas was unconstitutional in light of the California legislature’s sub-
sequent amendment of the state’s death penalty statute; the Court
73. Id.
74. Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000).
75. 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated on other
grounds, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (remanded for reconsideration in light of changed statute).
76. Id. at 1415.
77. Former Cal. Penal Code § 3604(b) (West 1992) provided that “[i]f a person under
sentence of death does not choose either lethal gas or lethal injection . . . the penalty of
death shall be imposed by lethal gas.”
78. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996).
79. Id. at 308.
80. Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996).
81. 528 U.S. 1133 (2000); see also supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
82. California’s amended death penalty statute now provides that lethal injection shall
be used unless the inmate requests lethal gas. Cal. Penal Code § 3604(b) (West 1996) (lethal
gas or lethal injection at the condemned’s election; lethal injection if the condemned fails to
choose a method).
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also remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the legisla-
ture’s decision to change the statute and provide that lethal
injection be administered unless the inmate requests lethal gas.83
The power of the legislature’s change would be evident three years
later.  In Stewart v. LaGrand,84 for example, the Court held that the
death row inmate waived his claim that execution by lethal gas vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment because the inmate chose to be
executed by lethal gas rather than lethal injection.85
2. The Firing Squad and Electrocution Cases
The Glossip Court therefore skirts any discussion involving states’
efforts to avoid the constitutional scrutiny of their execution meth-
ods. The Court also mischaracterizes prior cases that appear to
constitutionally endorse the firing squad or electrocution under the
Eighth Amendment. For example, the Court concludes that it “up-
held a sentence of death by firing squad”86 in Wilkerson v. Utah.87
But Wilkerson was decided in 1878, nearly a century before the
Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.88 Therefore the Constitu-
tion’s standard of Cruel and Unusual Punishments was not then
applicable to the states.89 Furthermore, in Wilkerson, the Court held
in dicta only that shooting is not a cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.90 The Court never reviewed evi-
dence on the cruelty of shooting, nor did the plaintiff raise this
issue.  Rather, the plaintiff protested the application of a Utah stat-
ute authorizing the death penalty for first-degree murder. The
plaintiff claimed that, because the statute did not specify the
83. Gomez, 519 U.S. at 918 (1996). In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted the irony of the
Court’s remand given that it was clear that the inmate’s only choice was lethal injection:
“[U]nder either the terms of the new statute or the terms of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, lethal injections will be used to carry out these respondents’ sentences.” Id. at 919
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. 526 U.S. 115 (1999).
85. Id. at 118–19 n.34.
86. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015).
87. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
88. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
89. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 130.
90. Id. at 135.
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method of execution, the trial court could not approve a death sen-
tence that the plaintiff be publicly shot.91  Therefore the Court
affirmed the lower court’s determination that the judiciary was au-
thorized to prescribe an inmate’s method of execution even though
the legislature had failed to mention a particular method.92
The Glossip Court is also wrong to imply that the Court “rejected
a challenge to the use of the electric chair”93 in two cases—In re
Kemmler94 and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber.95 Significantly,
like Wilkerson, the Court decided Kemmler and Resweber before 1962,
the year when the Court determined that the Eighth Amendment
did apply to the states.96 In addition, neither Kemmler nor Resweber
pertained to the constitutionality of electrocution per se. In Kem-
mler, for example, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did
not apply to the states, and deferred to the New York legislature’s
conclusion that electrocution was not a cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the state’s Electrical Execution Act.97 Although courts
have cited Kemmler to dismiss challenges to the constitutionality of
electrocution, such reliance is incorrect.98 Likewise, Resweber con-
cerned the issue of whether petitioner Willie Francis should be
executed at all since the first attempt to execute him by electrocu-
tion failed.99 Even though the Resweber Court reviewed the facts and
troublesome science of electrocution, the Court’s focus was narrow
and the case was decided fifteen years before the Eighth Amend-
ment’s incorporation.100
In sum, neither Kemmler nor Resweber involved challenges to elec-
trocution per se, but instead raised narrower questions.
91. Id. at 131; see also id. at 132–37 (holding that, although the Utah Territory’s legisla-
ture had made no provision for a method of execution in the 1876 Code, which superseded
the 1852 law, the petitioner could properly be sentenced to death by shooting).
92. Id. at 137.
93. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015).
94. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
95. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
96. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
97. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443.  For a broader analysis of the history and modern use of
Kemmler, see Denno, Engineering of Death, supra note 31.
98. For an examination of cases that cite to Kemmler for such an incorrect proposition,
see Denno, Engineering of Death, supra note 31, at 687–89.
99. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 459.
100. For an analysis of the history and legal backdrop of Resweber as well as the case’s
misuse in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion), see Deborah W. Denno, When
Willie Francis Died: The Disturbing Story Behind One of the Eighth Amendment’s Most Enduring Stan-
dards of Risk, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 1, 17–94 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds.,
2009).
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Furthermore, the Glossip Court never mentions that two states, Ne-
braska101 and Georgia,102 have both held electrocution
unconstitutional under their respective state statutes. In addition,
the Court does not acknowledge that all former electrocution states
now use lethal injection as either the sole method or a choice
method because of the problems associated with electrocution.103
This backdrop is critical for examining the Glossip Court’s viabil-
ity as precedent for two reasons. First, the Court mischaracterizes
the history of the constitutionality of execution methods, implying
through omission or indirect assertion that the history is un-
problematic, when it has long been plagued by botched executions
and gross ineptitude on the part of legislatures, courts, and depart-
ments of corrections.104  As a result of these problems, starting in
the nineteenth century, states continuously switched from one
method of execution to the next to search for the “more” or “most”
humane method of execution as well as to avoid potential constitu-
tional challenges to the method they sought to replace.105 Second,
the Court’s veneer of acceptance of midazolam provides fuel for
the Court’s requirement that petitioners demonstrate “a known
and available alternative method of execution” as a possible re-
placement to lethal injection. After all, if the Court has “never
invalidated” any of the prior execution methods, including the
three-drug procedure in Baze, such a track record spotlights the sta-
tus quo’s success.  Any effort to change an accepted execution
method should require petitioners to overcome steep obstacles. Yet
the brief and one-sided story that the Glossip Court tells defies the
long-documented case law and scholarship that offer a substantially
different perspective. This contrast, among others, puts Glossip on
shaky ground as precedent.
101. In 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court held electrocution to be unconstitutional. See
State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008). A year later, the Nebraska legislature
adopted lethal injection. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (2010).
102. In 2001, the Georgia Supreme Court held electrocution to be unconstitutional. See
Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 144 (Ga. 2001) (explaining that electrocution’s “specter of
excruciating pain and its certainty of cooked brains” constituted cruel and unusual
punishment).
103. For an overview of how, when, and where these switches from electrocution to lethal
injection occurred, see generally Denno, Engineering of Death, supra note 31; Denno, Getting to
Death, supra note 31; Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1333–34; Denno, Lethal
Injection Quandary, supra note 40, at 51–101; Denno, Paved with Paradox, supra note 21;
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 40, at 90–141.
104. See supra notes 58–103 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
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B. Glossip’s Focus on “Anti-Death-Penalty Advocates”
The Glossip Court’s distorted history raises a third concern. If this
country’s experiences with execution methods have been primarily
inconsequential, and the problems with lethal injection’s three-
drug protocol seemingly quelled by Baze, it is unclear how the issues
in Glossip evolved. The Court’s answer, in a nutshell, is “anti-death-
penalty advocates.”106 After Baze had presumably fostered states’
abilities to successfully carry out executions quickly and hu-
manely—a fictional representation in and of itself—“anti-death-
penalty advocates” introduced yet another vehicle of obstruction by
“pressur[ing] pharmaceutical companies to refuse to supply the
drugs used to carry out death sentences.”107
The Court never identifies, however, who these “anti-death-pen-
alty advocates” are. Nor does the Court explicate how these anti-
death-penalty advocates possessed such extraordinary power to cre-
ate the drug shortages that dismantled the original three-drug
protocol validated in Baze. The Court also fails to explain how or
why such shortages forced states like Oklahoma to acquire inappro-
priate drugs, such as midazolam, when these states could have
chosen other types of drugs for their protocol.108  While the Court
focuses on the “anti-death-penalty advocate” explanation as it re-
counts all the factors driving lethal injection’s troubles, the Court
never mentions that three of the most highly influential factors had
nothing to do with anti-death penalty advocacy.
The first factor, for example, reveals that post-Baze efforts to
reignite the execution process were problematic from the start,
even before the issues with drug shortages came about.109 Rather
than eliminating obstacles, the same sorts of impediments that have
always accompanied lethal injection executions followed Baze—
namely, inexperienced or incompetent prison personnel, and
106. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2733 (2015).
107. Id.
108. See supra note 23 and accompanying text and infra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text.
109. For a discussion of these post-Baze efforts to restart lethal injection, see generally
Deborah W. Denno, Introduction to The Lethal Injection Debate: Law & Science, 35 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 701 (2008) [hereinafter Denno, Lethal Injection Debate]; Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos,
supra note 19; Denno, Paved with Paradox, supra note 21; Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and
Execution—Highlights from a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 448 (2008)
(with Deborah Denno, Atul Gawande, Robert D. Truog & David Waisael) [hereinafter Per-
spective Roundtable].
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vague protocols and constraints on execution witnesses.110 A contin-
uing wave of troubles also followed the Baze decision concerning
the selection, training, preparation, and qualifications of the lethal
injection team. The types and sources of drugs used in lethal injec-
tion executions are just a small part of the problem, since the entire
process can be riddled with disorganization and preparatory may-
hem irrespective of whatever is injected into the inmate.  Lethal
injection botches and ineptitude on all levels post-Baze have far ex-
ceeded the difficulties that existed pre-Baze.111
A second influential factor was that, at least initially, the deple-
tion of sodium thiopental had nothing to do with the death
penalty. In 2014, a report published by the Government Accounta-
bility Office documented a variety of drug shortages occurring
throughout the country from January 2007, a year-and-a-half before
Baze was decided, to June 2013. The report included a review of the
shortages associated with the chemicals used to create sodium thio-
pental.112 Thus, the start of the scarcity of sodium thiopental in the
United States was wholly divorced from the so-called anti-death-
penalty “movement.”  Rather, the lethal injection process was af-
fected by a pharmaceutical fact of life: drugs can often become
unavailable, at times unpredictably. These shortages can impact citi-
zens’ health and, in the case of lethal injection, their death.
The third, and perhaps most significant, factor concerns the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court’s decision in Cook v. FDA.113 In 2013,
Cook held that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) must
approve all drugs imported into the country, including the drugs
used in lethal injection protocols.114 This decision extinguished ef-
forts by departments of corrections to purchase lethal injection
drugs outside of the country because those drugs did not meet FDA
standards,115 a matter that is still the subject of dispute. For exam-
ple, in May 2015, the FDA informed Nebraska that it could not
110. For an overview of these impediments, see generally Denno, Lethal Injection Debate,
supra note 109; Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19; Denno, Paved with Paradox, supra
note 21; Perspective Roundtable, supra note 109.
111. See Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1339–81. See generally Lethal Injec-
tion, Politics, and the Future of the Death Penalty, 49 RICH. L. REV. 671 (2015) (a symposium
reviewing the wide range of problems surrounding lethal injection).
112. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-194, DRUG SHORTAGES: PUBLIC
HEALTH THREAT CONTINUES, DESPITE EFFORTS TO HELP ENSURE PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 14 fig.
4, 21 (2014).
113. 733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
114. Id. at 12.
115. See generally Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1361–63 (discussing the
Cook case).
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import sodium thiopental from India to use in the state’s lethal in-
jection executions even though the Nebraska Department of
Corrections had paid $54,400 for the drug.116  In October 2015, the
FDA also stopped Texas and Arizona from importing sodium thio-
pental from India, and investigative reporters revealed that Harris
Pharma had sold to all three states.117 Investigators discovered that
Chris Harris, the head of Harris Pharma, had no pharmaceutical
training whatsoever, as well as a flawed record he could better hide
in India, away from FDA scrutiny.118  Once again, departments of
corrections in key death penalty states were willing to buy and ille-
gally use a death penalty drug from a grossly disreputable source,119
all the while knowing that faulty drugs heighten the likelihood of a
botched execution.120  Yet Nebraska, Texas, and Arizona are still try-
ing to get around the FDA ruling so that they can continue their
executions using Harris Pharma’s drugs, despite their very low like-
lihood of success.121
1. Who Are the “Anti-Death-Penalty Advocates”?
Overall, then, departments of corrections were not impacted di-
rectly by anti-death-penalty advocates when they purchased
substitute drugs for lethal injection purposes. This circumstance
prompts two questions: who are the anti-death-penalty advocates
that the Court references, and what exactly did they do to the lethal
injection process? One of the great frustrations of Glossip is that the
Court never fully addresses nor answers these questions.  Instead,
the Court explains the troubles that these “anti-death-penalty advo-
cates” created, even though scholars and the news media
116. Garrett Epps, Out of Spite: The Governor of Nebraska’s Threat to Execute Prisoners, THE
ATLANTIC (June 5, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/a-governor-
threatens-to-execute-prisoners-out-of-spite/394949/.
117. Chris McDaniel & Chris Geidner, Arizona, Texas Purchased Execution Drugs Illegally
Overseas, But FDA Halts the Import, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
chrismcdaniel/arizona-texas-purchased-execution-drugs-illegally#.xaxV8Jb32; Tasneem Nash-
rulla, Chris McDaniel & Chris Geidner, Three States Bought Illegal Execution Drugs from Supplier
in India, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/tasneemnashrulla/
three-states-bought-illegal-execution-drugs-from-supplier-in#.qt42bx1av/.
118. Chris McDaniel & Tasneem Nashrulla, This is the Man in India Who is Selling States
Illegally Imported Execution Drugs, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
chrismcdaniel/this-is-the-man-in-india-who-is-selling-states-illegally-imp#.twR3doPG6.
119. See infra notes 108–53 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
121. McDaniel & Geidner, supra note 117; Nashrulla, McDaniel & Geidner, supra note
117.
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documented both the continued quest by departments of correc-
tions to seek drugs and the resulting protocol changes.122
One reason why the Court may have evaded answering these
questions is because providing an explanation would require a de-
tailed account of all the problems facing legislatures, courts, and
departments of corrections in the time between Baze and the grant
of certiorari to Glossip. These troubles include a host of terribly
botched lethal injection executions documented by petitioners’
briefs, academics, and the media, and the highly problematic ef-
forts by departments of corrections to acquire the drugs necessary
for execution.123 Instead, the Court resolves this dilemma—in just a
few pages—by scapegoating the “anti-death-penalty advocates” who
supposedly created the shortages and, therefore, all of the
problems with lethal injection that Baze had presumably cleared.124
The Glossip Court first points to the “activists” who “pressured”
not only the company that made sodium thiopental (Hospira) in
both the United States and Italy, but also the Italian government, in
order to get both sources to stop selling sodium thiopental in the
United States.125 Later, activists also extended such pressure to
Lundbeck, the Danish manufacturer of pentobarbital, the drug
prisons used when sodium thiopental was no longer available.126
These drug-blocking efforts came as no surprise to those who know
that almost all European countries prohibit the death penalty, and
that the European Union encourages banning the death penalty in
all countries.127 Anti-death-penalty advocacy groups in Europe, such
122. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos, supra note 19, at 1333–34; Lethal Injection, DEATH PEN-
ALTY INFO. CENTER, supra note 12.
123. For a discussion of these problems and botched executions, see generally Glossip v.
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2780–96 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the challenges
with lethal injection generally and the particular problems associated with midazolam); Eric
Berger, The Executioners’ Dilemmas, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 731, 731 (2015) (contending that states
“do not devote sufficient care to their lethal injection procedures,” thereby resulting in
Eighth Amendment violations); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Politics of Botched Executions, 49 U.
RICH. L. REV. 825, 827–43 (2015) (discussing the four major botched lethal injection execu-
tions of 2014 and the troubling and inadequate state responses); Joel Zivot, Lethal Injection:
States Medicalize Execution, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 711, 715–29 (2015) (noting that the Supreme
Court neither understands the effects of lethal injection drugs in the human body nor the
impact of the Baze Court’s decision on the medical profession and the practice of medicine).
124. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733 (“Baze cleared any legal obstacle to use of the most com-
mon three-drug protocol that had enabled States to carry out the death penalty in a quick
and painless fashion.”).
125. See id. (explaining that “anti-death-penalty advocates pressured pharmaceutical com-
panies to refuse to supply the drugs used to carry out death sentences”).
126. See id. at 2734.
127. See generally Gibson & Lain, supra note 40, at 1236–40.
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as Reprieve, are particularly focused on eliminating the death pen-
alty by way of stopping lethal injection.128 Yet these groups, as
effective as they are, could not possibly have the degree of impact
that the Court presumably attributed to them.  There are additional
forces at play.129
It appears the Glossip Court would include European countries
and the European Union under its “anti-death-penalty advocates”
umbrella given the extent of the Court’s discussion of European
blocks on lethal injection drugs.130 But targeting European coun-
tries as disrupting the U.S. death penalty ignores the reality that
each country has a right to refuse to sell drugs created for health to
the United States, where they will be injected to cause death. Even
if part of the pressure stems from a particularly influential anti-
death-penalty advocacy group, such as Reprieve, these groups are
often simply informational messengers to European drug compa-
nies and pharmacies. Frequently, drug companies are unaware of
how their drugs are being used, and are disturbed and concerned
when anti-death-penalty advocacy groups inform them.131 In this
sense, the Court’s use of the term “pressure” is misleading: provid-
ing information is not pressure.
Of course a company’s association with the death penalty also
can have financially detrimental effects that can deter its willingness
to sell lethal injection drugs to departments of corrections. Con-
sumers may not want to purchase drugs that are linked to
executions.132 Regardless, even if the Court believed that European
countries constituted some of the “anti-death-penalty advocates”
the Court derides, Cook v. FDA133 would still require the FDA to ban
importation of these drugs from all countries, not just Europe.
128. See Lethal Injection, REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/topic/lethal-injection/
(last visited May 4, 2016).  Reprieve has a “Stop Lethal Injection Project” which “helps phar-
maceutical manufacturers, investors, and regulators prevent the misuse of medicines in the
execution of prisoners.” Id.
129. See infra notes 130–54 and accompanying text.
130. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733–34.
131. See Erik Eckholm, Pfizer Blocks the Use of Its Drugs in Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2016, at A1 (quoting an expert’s explanation that states have enacted strict secrecy provisions
around how lethal injection is conducted and the sources of the drugs injected not in an
effort to shield manufacturers from being exposed to public scrutiny but “‘to keep the manu-
facturers in the dark about the misuse of their products’”); Helping Pharmaceutical Companies
Stop Their Medicines Being Used to Kill, REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/case-study/issues-
helping-pharmaceutical-companies-stop-their-medicines-being-used-to-kill/ (last visited May
31, 2016) (noting that “the vast majority of affected drug manufacturers have acted to pre-
vent their products being sold to prisons for use in executions by lethal injection”).
132. Eckholm, supra note 131 (explaining that the companies that have restricted the use
of drugs in executions have done so for “either moral or business reasons”).
133. 733 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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Apart from Italy, England, and Denmark, what other sources
might be included among the “anti-death-penalty advocates” the
Court mentions?  Ironically, the FDA has most likely contributed
the most to the lethal injection drug shortages by way of Cook; yet,
the Court would hardly include the FDA as an “anti-death-penalty
advocacy” group nor as an institution that has been pressured by
such groups.  The FDA operates by its own standards, irrespective of
what is happening to the death penalty.
2. The Role of Medical Professionals
The same reasoning that applies to the FDA could also apply to
other groups that may not be traditionally considered anti-death-
penalty advocates nor as organizations necessarily influenced by
them.  There is a broad net of potential sources. That net could
encompass a range of medical professionals such as physicians,
nurses, and pharmacists, because all three groups have been in-
volved in lethal injection executions, either directly or indirectly.134
Doctors and other medical professionals have long participated in
carrying out all execution methods, most particularly lethal injec-
tion.135  Doctors not only created the original three-drug protocol,
but also advised legislatures, courts and prisons about the types and
amounts of lethal injection drugs that should be used.136  In a num-
ber of executions, doctors have directly engaged in the actual
implementation of the injection procedure.137  During Oklahoma’s
horribly botched lethal injection of Clayton Lockett in 2014, for
134. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 40, at 51–101 (detailing the extent to
which medical professionals have been involved in lethal injection executions).
135. See Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88
N.C. L. Rev. 11, 12–49 (2009); Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 40, at 51–101.
136. See Alper, supra note 135, at 12–49; Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 40,
at 51–101.
137. See Alper, supra note 135, at 44–49; Ty Alper, The Role of State Medical Boards in Regu-
lating Physician Participation in Executions, 95 J. MED. LICENSURE & DISCIPLINE 1, 3 (2008);
Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 40, at 65–91; Atul Gawande, When Law and Ethics
Collide—Why Physicians Participate in Executions, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1221, 1223–28 (2006);
Shah, supra note 25, at 197. For an excellent and detailed overview of the problems with the
Clayton Lockett execution, including accompanying documentation, reports, interviews, re-
lated stories, and updates, see Cary Aspinwall & Ziva Branstetter, Records Reveal Lack of Protocol
in Clayton Lockett’s Oklahoma Execution, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.
com/homepage1/records-reveal-lack-of-protocol-in-clayton-lockett-s-oklahoma/article_e4f17
853-160c-530a-9f36-928a0fd9f605.html.
770 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:4
example138—the execution that prompted Glossip139 and now a blis-
tering grand jury report140—records show that both a doctor and an
Emergency Medical Technician tried to inject Lockett with drugs
under circumstances involving gross incompetence.141
The role of such medical professionals has long been controver-
sial, however, and medical organizations and drug manufacturers
have increasingly discouraged such participation on the basis that
doctors and drugs should promote health rather than death.142 The
International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists has similarly
discouraged its members from providing lethal injection drugs, the
group’s first official stance on the issue.143 The most sweeping dem-
onstration of this posture, however, is Pfizer Inc.’s May 2016
announcement that it had enforced restrictions on where its drugs
138. See Shah, supra note 25, at 148–50 (referring to the experimental dynamics of the
Clayton Lockett execution); Aspinwall & Branstetter, supra note 137 (offering continual re-
ports of the problems with the Clayton Lockett execution); see generally Interim Report
Number 14 of the Grand Jury, In the Matter of the Multicounty Grand Jury, State of
Oklahoma, Case No. SCAD-2014-70, at 4, 6, 22, 77, 100 (Okla. May 19, 2016) [hereinafter
Interim Report] (detailing a review of the state’s lethal injection protocol and procedural
problems that contributed to the complications with the Clayton Lockett execution).
139. Glossip v. Gross, 135, S.Ct. 2726, 2735 (2015).
140. Interim Report, supra note 138; see also Chris McDaniel, Scathing Oklahoma Report
Showcased Issues Common in Death Penalty States, BUZZFEED.COM, May 20, 2016, https://www.
buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/scathing-oklahoma-grand-jury-investigation-showcased-issues?
utm_term=.lcX1bDkdl#.scKN9Xj0p (noting that the grand jury report on recent Oklahoma
executions, including Clayton Lockett’s, was “scathing” in the way it depicted Oklahoma’s
“carelessness and dismissive attitude toward established procedures and the inmates’ rights”
as well as the “extreme, and sometimes arbitrary, level of secrecy in how the department
carries out executions”); Samantha Vicent, Grand Jury Probe Shows Secrecy Used In Execution
Process Caused Trouble, “Systemic Ineptitude,” TULSA WORLD, May 23, 2016, http://www.tul-
saworld.com/homepagelatest/grand-jury-probe-shows-secrecy-used-in-execution-process-
caused/article_76ae109b-ebd8-5f93-8813-44d26ad47fd1.html (explaining that “[a] national
expert on death penalty practices says the behavior of state officials highlighted in a grand
jury report on Oklahoma’s execution process is proof of ‘systemic ineptitude that under-
mines public faith in government’”).
141. See Aspinwall & Branstetter, supra note 137 (noting that a paramedic and doctor
were rapidly trying to find a vein on Clayton Lockett and start an IV to deliver his lethal
injection).
142. See Alper, supra note 135, at 44–49; Alper, supra note 137, at 3; Denno, Lethal Injection
Quandary, supra note 40, at 65–91; Gawande, supra note 137, at 1223–28; Shah, supra note 25,
at 197.
143. Press Release, International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists, IACP Adopts Position
on Compounding of Lethal Injection Drugs: Board Discourages Practice Among Members (Mar. 24,
2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/IACPPressRelease.pdf. The Board of
Directors of the International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists released the following
statement summarizing its adopted position on the issue:
While the pharmacy profession recognizes an individual practitioner’s right to deter-
mine whether to dispense a medication based upon his or her personal, ethical and
religious beliefs, IACP discourages its members from participating in the preparation,
dispensing, or distribution of compounded medications for use in legally authorized
executions. “The issue of compounded preparations being used in the execution of
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are distributed so that they could not be used in lethal injection
executions.144 Thus, the decision by Pfizer—one of the largest phar-
maceutical manufacturers in the world—along with similar types of
controls adopted by over twenty other drug companies, substan-
tially hinders departments of corrections’ efforts to get drugs.145
While such companies provide “either moral or business reasons”
for their decisions,146 it would be a gross mischaracterization to say
that they were buckling to pressure only by anti-death-penalty advo-
cacy groups.  According to Pfizer, for example, “medical principles
and business concerns have guided their policies,” not anti-death-
penalty campaigns or Europe’s block on exporting drugs.147 Like-
wise, pressure from shareholders concerned about harm to the
company’s reputation for health has shown far more influence.148
In essence, then, medical professionals and pharmaceutical compa-
nies do not need anti-death-penalty advocacy groups to tell them to
avoid involvement in the death penalty process—they already know.
“Anti-death-penalty advocates” could also include the public it-
self. After all, drug companies seem to fear negative public
perception above all else.149 If the public links a company and its
drugs to the death penalty process, the financial repercussions
could be severe for the company150 even in the United States, where
a majority of individuals still support the death penalty.151 Because a
company’s association with the death penalty may not be a good
business model, a substantial number of states have enacted secrecy
provisions that shield the identity of medical professionals, pharma-
ceutical companies, and pharmacies involved with the execution
prisoners sentenced to capital punishment continues to be a topic of significant inter-
est. It is important to first understand the origin of this issue: states are turning to
compounded preparations for this purpose because the companies that manufacture
the products traditionally used have unilaterally decided to stop selling them for use
in executions. IACP believes that a national discussion needs to be conducted on
whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer can restrict the use of FDA approved prod-
ucts only to purposes that adhere to their corporate values.
Id.
144. Eckholm, supra note 131; Christopher Matthews & Ashby Jones, Pfizer Tightens Con-
trols to Block Use of Its Drug in Executions, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/pfizer-tightens-controls-to-block-use-of-its-drugs-in-executions-1463183996.
145. Eckholm, supra note 131; Matthews & Jones, supra note 144.
146. Eckholm, supra note 131.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Mark Kessel, Restoring the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Reputation, 32 NATURE BIOTECH.
983, 983–99 (2014).
150. Clare Algar, Big Pharma May Help End the Death Penalty, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 22,
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115284/big-pharma-may-end-death-penalty.
151. See Public Opinion About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited May 4, 2016).
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process.152 Yet Pfizer’s decision may make it so that all these entities,
especially compounding pharmacies, want to buck contributing to
the process altogether, irrespective of the guarantee of secrecy. Re-
gardless, states continue to have problems finding drug sources,153 a
circumstance suggesting that anonymity is not enough to keep
these groups involved in the lethal injection process.
If members of the public and selected medical and pharmacy
groups can be considered anti-death-penalty advocates, at some
point the Court may have to face a growing reality: “anti-death-pen-
alty advocates” may simply represent the general American public.
With such a development, the Court may, yet again, be accused of
being out of touch with mainstream America.154  Because depart-
ments of corrections could be boxed into an execution methods
corner if lethal injection becomes unworkable, they may ultimately
need a drug-free alternative method of execution to help them es-
cape.  Finding a method that is also “a known and available
alternative” may simply be a matter of states reverting to a more
simplistic past execution method.
II. THE “KNOWN AND AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE” STANDARD
The Glossip Court affirmed Oklahoma’s use of midazolam in part
because “the petitioners failed to identify a known and available al-
ternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a
requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution
claims.”155  While no court set forth such a standard prior to Baze—
and Justice Sotomayor provided a detailed critique of such a re-
quirement156—the Glossip Court nonetheless accepted this dictate
for evaluating the constitutionality of any execution method. This
Article therefore abides by the alternative methods mandate for
analysis purposes although it does not agree that it should be part
of the Eighth Amendment doctrine for evaluating execution
methods.157
152. For insightful discussions of the problems with state secrecy provisions and how de-
pleting drugs can expand them even further, see Berger, supra note 40, 1388–440; Mary D.
Fan, The Supply-Side Attack on Lethal Injection and the Rise of Execution Secrecy, 95 B.U. L. REV. 427
(2015).
153. See supra notes 112–20 and accompanying text.
154. For an overall discussion of the Court’s proclivity to be out of touch, see generally
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SU-
PREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
155. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
156. See id. at 2792–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
157. This Article agrees with the conclusion reached by Justice Sotomayor. See id.
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A. The Standard’s Meaning
A key question in assessing any execution method concerns what
the “known and available” standard means in practical terms. Glos-
sip turns to Baze for guidance.158 According to Baze, petitioners
“cannot successfully challenge a State’s method of execution
merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative.”159 Rather,
they must put forth an alternative method that is “feasible, readily
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk
of severe pain.”160 Thus, in Baze and Glossip, the Court proposed a
two-part test that required petitioners to “establish both that [a
state’s] lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of se-
vere pain and that the risk is substantial when compared to known
and available alternatives.”161 Although it is a two-part test, the
Court’s language suggests that the first part, “risk of severe pain,”
depends on the second part because the risk is “compared to the
known and available alternatives.”162 Because the Court made clear
that the petitioners in Baze and Glossip never met either part of the
test, there is no precedent for what kind of alternative the Court
would find acceptable. Therefore, an alternative method argument
relies on the Court’s language and little more.
The other Justices do not add their own personal interpretation
of this standard apart from Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Justice Ste-
phen Breyer’s thorough overview of the problems associated with
the death penalty generally bypasses anything that the majority has
to say about the “known and available” standard.163 Of course, Jus-
tice Breyer does sign on to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent and perhaps
did not feel the need to discuss the matter in his own dissent.164
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas focus on Justice
Breyer’s dissent.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence165 criticizes Justice
Breyer’s recommendation that there be broader consideration of
whether the death penalty is unconstitutional; Justice Thomas’s
concurrence166 questions the methodological challenges associated
158. Id. at 2731, 2737–38.
159. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 52.
161. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2780 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 2746 (Scalia, J., concurring).
166. See id. at 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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with some of the studies Justice Breyer cites. As media commenta-
tors noted, Justice Breyer’s lengthy dissent dominated Glossip and
the public’s discussion of the case’s significance.167
B. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent stands out as the primary vehicle for
critiquing the “known and available alternative standard,” by thor-
oughly explaining why it is unjustified for the Glossip Court to
attribute this standard so substantially to Baze.168  First, Baze never
articulated such a mandate, much less one as conditionally depen-
dent as the Glossip Court makes it to out to be. Otherwise, the
resulting message would have “[led] to patently absurd conse-
quences.”169  As Justice Sotomayor notes, “[a] method of execution
that is intolerably painful—even to the point of being the chemical
equivalent of burning alive—will, the Court holds, be unconstitu-
tional if, and only if, there is a ‘known and available alternative’
method of execution.”170  While the Glossip Court states that Baze
precluded all arguments that would suggest otherwise, Justice
Sotomayor stresses that “Baze held no such thing.”171 For example,
the Glossip Court refers only to the Baze plurality opinion to support
its version of the “known and available alternative” requirement; yet
none of the Baze concurrences, which were needed to back the Baze
Court’s judgment, pronounced a comparable perspective.172 Even
the Baze plurality never stated “that all challenges” to a state’s exe-
cution method must be subject to such a “comparative-risk”
assessment.173  As Justice Sotomayor states, “[r]ecognizing the rele-
vance of available alternatives is not at all the same as concluding
that their absence precludes a claimant from showing that a chosen
method carries objectively intolerable risks.”174
Justice Sotomayor nonetheless contributes an analysis of what “a
known and available alternative method of execution” could be,
167. For examples of key media articles focusing on Justice Breyer’s dissent, see Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Use of Execution Drug, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-execution-drug.html?_r=0; Charlie Savage,
Highlights from the Supreme Court Decision on Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/us/2014-term-supreme-court-decision-lethal-injection.
html.
168. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2792–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2795.
170. Id. at 2793.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2794.
174. Id.
SUMMER 2016] The Firing Squad 775
even though she doesn’t agree with the requirement. As such, her
approach provides potential guidance for future courts and liti-
gators who seemingly have no choice but to operate within the
confines of Glossip.  What Justice Sotomayor proposes could turn
Glossip on its head: condemned inmates might reject lethal injec-
tion and “suggest the firing squad as an alternative.”175 She hones
this point by considering the evidence that would be most pertinent
to inmates making this suggestion. For example, “the firing squad is
significantly more reliable than other methods, including lethal in-
jection” and “there is some reason to think that it is relatively quick
and painless.”176 While the firing squad “could be seen as a devolu-
tion to a more primitive era,”177 and “the blood and violence that
comes with it” a step in that direction,178 those characterizations do
not make the firing squad “unconstitutional.”179 That said, the
method’s “visible brutality” could potentially prompt Eighth
Amendment arguments.180
Justice Sotomayor’s final assessments of the firing squad are the
most compelling because they consider the calculation of the
method’s cruelty versus visible violence through the eyes of a con-
demned inmate. As Justice Sotomayor explains, an inmate may view
the “visible yet relatively painless violence” associated with the firing
squad as “vastly preferable to an excruciatingly painful death hid-
den behind a veneer of medication.”181 With that statement, Justice
Sotomayor rightly acknowledges that lethal injection may be even
more gruesome than the firing squad if only we were allowed to see
behind lethal injection’s “curtain.”182  A substantial literature and
case law suggest that she is correct.183
C. The Court’s Misinterpretation of Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is detailed and comprehensive, cover-
ing a number of different topics and arguments.  Yet it is intriguing
that the Glossip majority focuses on her commentary about the fir-
ing squad, particularly given the commentary’s brevity and
175. Id. at 2796.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2797.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 106–54 and accompanying text.
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hypothetical posture. Indeed, the Glossip majority completely mis-
characterizes what Justice Sotomayor says about the firing squad,
and also inaccurately attributes her comments to other methods of
execution.  According to the Court, for example, Justice Sotomayor
implies that any state that uses any of the four methods of execu-
tion existing prior to lethal injection would violate the Eighth
Amendment.184 This reasoning holds, says the majority, even
though Justice Sotomayor concedes that “ ‘there is some reason to
think that [the firing squad] is relatively quick and painless.’”185
While Justice Sotomayor mentions neither electrocution nor lethal
gas, the Court nonetheless incorporates these other methods in its
analysis of her statements. Indeed, the Court interprets Justice
Sotomayor’s arguments as implying that “it would be unconstitu-
tional to use a method that ‘could be seen as a devolution to a more
primitive era.’”186 Yet Justice Sotomayor says no such thing. Using
this misguided approach, the Court suggests that Justice Sotomayor
boxes in the choices of execution methods: past execution methods
are unacceptable because they are “primitive,” while present meth-
ods are unacceptable because there is no viable drug.187 The end
result, in the Court’s view, is an argument siding with eliminating
the death penalty.188
Justice Sotomayor, however, never makes the argument the ma-
jority attributes to her but argues just the opposite.  She explicitly
states that the brutality of a firing squad execution does not render
the method unconstitutional and that it may be far preferable to
the torment of lethal injection drugs.189 In addition, she does not
argue against the death penalty in general and notably did not join
Justice Breyer’s anti-death penalty dissent.  Instead, Justice
Sotomayor provides guidance for the most humane way to imple-
ment the death penalty within the context of Glossip. While Justice
Sotomayor suggests that the firing squad may also be viewed as a
“devolution” and may raise Eighth Amendment issues,190 her con-
cerns about the method are warranted.  For example, neither she
nor any other court has provided the kind of detailed analysis of
the science or strategy behind the firing squad that would assuage
184. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739.
185. Id. (quoting Sotomayor, J., dissenting at 2796).
186. Id. (quoting Sotomayor, J., dissenting at 2796).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2796–97.
190. Id.
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any and all Eighth Amendment questions.191 Rather, Justice
Sotomayor explains why the firing squad may be a viable alternative
method of execution, thereby pointing in a direction that makes
sense for legislatures and courts to consider.
III. THE FIRING SQUAD ALTERNATIVE
This Part suggests that the firing squad could potentially meet
Glossip’s “alternative method” requirements of being “known,”
“available,” and “entail[ing] a lesser risk of pain.”192  For example,
the firing squad has a long history and world-wide application
(“known”);193 it is pervasive in many dimensions of our society rang-
ing from law enforcement to self-protection (“available”);194 and
there is evidence suggesting it is the quickest, least painful, and
most reliable method that currently exists (“a lesser risk of
pain”).195  As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent in Wood v. Ryan196
suggests, the firing squad also satisfies an array of practical and con-
stitutional concerns that counter the long-held problems associated
with lethal injection procedures. While Judge Kozinski’s observa-
tions were made nearly a year before Glossip was decided,197 they
firmly fit within the Glossip “alternative method” standard:
The firing squad strikes me as the most promising
[method]. Eight or ten large-caliber rifle bullets fired at close
range can inflict massive damage, causing instant death every
time.  There are plenty of people employed by the state who
can pull the trigger and have the training to aim true. The
weapons and ammunition are bought by the state in massive
quantities for law enforcement purposes, so it would be impos-
sible to interdict the supply.  And nobody can argue that the
weapons are put to a purpose for which they are not intended:
firearms have no purpose other than destroying their targets.198
191. As this Article notes, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), did not uphold the
constitutionality of the firing squad under an Eighth Amendment analysis. See supra notes
86–92 and accompanying text.
192. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731.
193. See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
194. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 268–76 and accompanying text.
196. 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Chief Judge Kozinski acknowledges that “firing squads can be
messy” because “we are shedding human blood.”199  Regardless, le-
thal injection can also be “messy” and bloody in ways that medical
experts, lawyers, and scholars have increasingly documented de-
spite departments of corrections’ efforts to shield the entire process
in secrecy.200 As the following sections note, observers of modern
firing squad executions do not describe “mess,” “visible brutality,”
or “blood,” but rather a process that may be far more “sterile” in
perception and procedure than lethal injection.
A. Firing Squad As A “Known” Method
The first documented firing squad execution occurred in Vir-
ginia in 1608.201 Prior to 1789, there were thirty firing squad
executions recorded, most in Louisiana and California.202 Along
with hanging, the firing squad is this country’s oldest method of
execution. While the military has conducted a substantial number
of firing squad executions during our nation’s history,203 this Article
focuses on civilian executions taking place in the United States. In
total, American firing squads have executed 144 inmates.204
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 24, 104, 111, 123, 138–41, 222 and accompanying text.
201. M. WATT ESPY & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1608–1987
at i (1987) [hereinafter ESPY file]; see also GEOFFREY ABBOTT, EXECUTION 103 (2005) (referring
to the execution of George Kendall, the first execution in the American colonies).
202. Cutler, supra note 32, at 398.
203. Id. at 337 n.5 (noting that “at least 185 men were executed by firing squad during
the Civil War”).  Historically, the military used the firing squad as a method of execution for
those soldiers who engaged in desertion, mutiny, or other types of military offenses. See FRED-
ERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL YOU ARE DEAD: THE BOOK OF EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 89 (1990); see
also Firing Squad, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 189 (Louis
J. Palmer, ed. 2008) (noting the use of the firing squad in the military). Of the 40,000 service-
men who deserted during World War II, only 49 received death sentences for desertion, and
only one, Private Donald Edward Slovik, was actually executed. DRIMMER, supra, at 106–07.
The Death Penalty Information Center provides data from a document discovered at the
Pentagon that enumerates those executions governed by the military from 1945 through
1961.  Most of those executions used hanging while the others used the firing squad or the
method was unknown. See Executions in the Military, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-military (last visited May 11, 2016).
204. ESPY file, supra note 201, at 5.  The Espy file documents all firing squad executions
that took place in the colonies, the territories, and the states from 1608 through 1987, ex-
cluding military executions. Id. at i–iv.  The Espy file lists 142 firing squad executions. Id. at
5.  Since the time the Espy file was compiled, Utah executed two more inmates: John Albert
Taylor in 1996, see infra notes 287–94, 315, and Ronnie Lee Gardner in 2010, see infra notes
241, 316–17. Thus, the total number of firing squad executions in the United States is 144.
SUMMER 2016] The Firing Squad 779
Currently two states permit execution by firing squad:
Oklahoma205 and Utah.206 In both states lethal injection is the pre-
dominant method and the firing squad is only an alternative.207 In
Oklahoma, the firing squad is an alternative only if a death sen-
tence cannot be carried out by one of three other methods of
execution, in descending order of priority: lethal injection, nitro-
gen hypoxia, and then electrocution.208 In 2015, Oklahoma
205. The firing squad is the fourth execution method in Oklahoma. H.B. 1879, 55th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015).  The Oklahoma statute provides as follows:
§ 1014 (A) The punishment of death shall be carried out by the administration of a
lethal quantity of a drug or drugs until death is pronounced by a licensed physician
according to accepted standards of medical practice.
(B) If the execution of the sentence of death as provided in subsection A of this
section is held unconstitutional by an appellate court of competent jurisdiction or is
otherwise unavailable, then the sentence of death shall be carried out by nitrogen
hypoxia.
(C) If the execution of the sentence of death as provided in subsections A and B
of this section is held unconstitutional by an appellate court of competent jurisdiction
or is otherwise unavailable, then the sentence of death shall be carried out by
electrocution.
(D) If the execution of the sentence of death as provided in subsections A, B and
C of this section is held unconstitutional by an appellate court of competent jurisdic-
tion or is otherwise unavailable, then the sentence of death shall be carried out by
firing squad.
Id.
206. In 2015, Utah brought back the firing squad.  Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5 (Lexis-
Nexis 2015).  The Utah statute provides as follows:
(1) (a) When a defendant is convicted of a capital felony and the judgment of death
has been imposed, lethal intravenous injection is the method of execution.
(b) Subsection (1)(a) applies to any defendant sentenced to death on or after
May 3, 2004, except under Subsections (2), (3), and (4).
(2) If a court holds that a defendant has a right to be executed by a firing squad, the
method of execution for that defendant shall be a firing squad. This Subsection (2)
applies to any defendant whose right to be executed by a firing squad is preserved by
that judgment.
(3)(a) If a court holds that execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional on its
face, the method of execution shall be a firing squad.
(b) If a court holds that execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional as ap-
plied, the method of execution for that defendant shall be a firing squad.
(4) The method of execution for the defendant is the firing squad if the sentencing
court determines the state is unable to lawfully obtain the substance or substances
necessary to conduct an execution by lethal intravenous injection 30 or more days
prior to the date specified in the warrant issued upon a judgment of death under
Section 77-19-6.
Id.
207. Okla. H.B. 1879 at § 1014 (A); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5 (1)(a).
208. Okla. H.B. 1879 at § 1014 (D).
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adopted nitrogen gas,209 a much criticized and risky method,210
thereby making it even less likely that the state would use the firing
squad unless it changed its execution methods statute.  Utah, on
the other hand, authorizes the firing squad only if the state is not
able to obtain lethal injection drugs or lethal injection is declared
unconstitutional.211 The legislature has not considered any other
execution method.
For nearly three decades (from 1982–2009), Idaho also allowed
the firing squad to be an alternative to lethal injection,212 but only
when lethal injection was “impractical.”213 After Baze v. Rees upheld
the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol,214 how-
ever, Idaho decided that the firing squad option was no longer
necessary.215 Besides, Idaho had never used the method.216  In con-
trast, in 2015, Wyoming came close to adopting the firing squad as
an alternative form of execution217 but the bill failed.218 Wyoming’s
209. Id. at (B).  The firing squad used to be third in line in Oklahoma. Now, with the
introduction of nitrogen gas, it is fourth in line. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31, at
390 (describing the earlier execution-method hierarchy in Oklahoma).
210. See Scott Christiansen, How Oklahoma Came to Embrace the Gas Chamber, NEW YORKER
(June 24, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-oklahoma-came-to-em
brace-the-gas-chamber?intcid=mod-latest.
211. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5 (LexisNexis 2015).
212. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 40, at 192–93; Bill Removes
Firing Squad As Execution Option, KTVB.COM (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.ktvb.com/story/
news/local/2014/06/27/11478095/.
213. IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (1987). The Idaho statute provides: “The punishment of
death shall be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an
ultra-short-acting barbituate [sic] in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until
death . . . .” Id. The director of the department of corrections will decide which substances
and procedures will be used. Id.  However,
“[i]n any case where the director finds it to be impractical to carry out the punish-
ment of death by administration of the required lethal substance or substances for the
reason that it is not reasonably possible to obtain expert technical assistance, should
such be necessary to assure that infliction of death by administration of such substance
or substances can be carried out in a manner which causes death without unnecessary
suffering, the sentence of death may be carried out by firing squad.”
Id.
214. 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008) (plurality opinion).
215. KTVB.COM, supra note 212.
216. See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpen
altyinfo.org/views-executions?exec_name_1=&sex=All&sex_1=All&method[ ]=Firing+Squad
&federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (showing
that all three firing squad executions from 1976 to 2016 took place only in Utah).
217. Laura Hancock, Wyoming House Passes Firing Squads Execution Bill, CASPER STAR TRIB-
UNE (Feb. 13, 2015), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/wyoming-
house-passes-firing-squads-execution-bill/article_1c77faca-32f5-5f00-8369-34ba66b0572d.
html.
218. Erin Jones, Firing Squad Bill Fails, WYO. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 12, 2015), http://wyoming
publicmedia.org/post/firing-squad-bill-fails.
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bill was unusual in that the inmate would have been anesthetized
and rendered unconscious before being shot,219 a requirement that
appeared to resemble some aspects of lethal injection.
Even states’ failed attempts to adopt the firing squad, however,
have garnered publicity for the method and a national spotlight for
its potential viability, especially given the problems with lethal injec-
tion.220  For example, as Austin Sarat has documented, from 1910-
2010, lethal injection had the highest botch rate of all execution
methods (7.12%).221  Another study of executions from 1976 to
2001 failed to detect any botched firing squad executions, even
though other methods, including lethal injection, were consistently
problematic.222 While there have been only three firing squad ex-
ecutions since 1976, when Gregg v. Georgia223 once again enabled
executions,224 all three executions went as predicted.225
B. Utah’s Firing Squad Procedure
The following overview of Utah’s firing squad procedures, the
most widely used and documented in this country, provides some
context for the method’s predictability.  That said, officials do not
release all details about the execution process. Therefore, this Arti-
cle’s account of Utah’s firing squad procedure is based on a limited
number of available sources, some of them official (Utah statutes
and provisions), as well as books, articles, and newspaper accounts
that describe past executions. Because a firing squad execution has
not been conducted in Utah since 2010, some procedures and de-
tails may change if another such execution takes place.226
In Utah, all inmates sentenced after May 3, 2004, are executed by
lethal injection,227 with three court-determined exceptions: (1) “a
defendant has a right to be executed by a firing squad;”228 (2) lethal
219. S. File 13, 63rd Leg., 2015 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2015).
220. DiStanislao, supra note 32, at 798.
221. SARAT, supra note 40, at 177–78.
222. See Arif Khan & Robyn M. Leventhal, Medical Aspects of Capital Punishment Executions,
47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 847, 849–50 (2002).
223. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
224. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
225. See infra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
226. Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/views-executions?exec_name_1=&sex=All&sex_1=All&method[ ]=Firing+Squad&
federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (showing
that the last firing squad execution conducted in this country was in 2010).
227. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (1)(a-b) (LexisNexis 2015).
228. § 77-18-5.5 (2).
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injection is found to be either “unconstitutional on its face”229 or
“unconstitutional as applied;”230 or (3) “the state is unable to law-
fully obtain the substance or substances necessary” to perform a
lethal injection execution thirty or more days prior to the death
warrant.231 According to statute, an execution will occur at “a secure
correctional facility” and at a time set by the department.232 Cur-
rently, the Utah Department of Corrections conducts executions at
Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah.233 The department’s executive
director or a “designee” chooses the five peace officers who com-
prise the firing squad.234
The Utah Department of Corrections provides details on who
shall witness an inmate’s execution, such as family members.235
Members of the news media are permitted to be present,236 al-
though the director is “responsible for selecting” who they will
be.237 The regulations also make clear that “[i]f extraordinary cir-
cumstances develop”238 or other conditions threaten “prison
security, personal safety,” the department may heighten restrictions
or limitations on media coverage during the procedure.239
The last firing squad execution at Utah State Prison—that of
Ronnie Lee Gardner in 2010—took place in the same room (cham-
ber) created for lethal injection executions; therefore, the room
contains both a lethal injection gurney and a firing squad chair for
229. § 77-18-5.5 (3)(a).
230. § 77-18-5.5 (3)(b).
231. § 77-18-5.5 (4).
232. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(1) (LexisNexis 2015); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-4
(1) (2015) (location and procedures).
233. DRIMMER, supra note 203, at 91; Execution Procedures, Utah State Prison (n.d.) (on
file with the author) (information released to the media at the time of the 2010 execution of
Ronnie Lee Gardner).  For a discussion of both the history and early modern use of the
firing squad, see generally L. KAY GILLESPIE, THE UNFORGIVEN: UTAH’S EXECUTED MEN (1991).
234. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(3); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-4 (3).
235. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11 (2015); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-6.
236. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-7 (1).
237. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-7 (3).
238. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-7 (7).
239. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-7 (6).
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the inmate to sit in depending on which method is selected.240  Pub-
lished articles,241 Utah State Prison materials,242 and eyewitness
accounts of the last (2010) firing squad execution,243 together de-
scribe the following set-up.  The inmate, whose head is covered by a
black hood, sits strapped to the firing squad chair, which is set
against one wall surrounded by sandbags.244  The sandbags prevent
the bullets from ricocheting off the walls and throughout the
room.245 About twenty or twenty-five feet across from the inmate is
the opposite wall with two slit-like openings.246 The anonymous fir-
ing squad members stand behind this wall and put their high-
240. Cutler, supra note 32, at 363–64; Execution Procedures, supra note 234. According
to the Execution Procedures distributed at the time of the Ronnie Lee Gardner firing squad
execution in 2010, the execution chamber or room was described as follows.
EXECUTION CHAMBER
The execution will take place at the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah.  The facil-
ity’s execution chamber was completed in 1998.  It has been used once—for a lethal
injection execution in the 1999 case of State of Utah vs. Joseph Mitchell Parsons.
The scheduled execution will be the first performed by firing squad in the perma-
nent chamber. The room is approximately 20 feet by 24 feet and is fitted with curtains
to cover the windows in the adjacent witness rooms.  The windows are complete with
bullet-proof, reflective glass to protect witnesses from unintended ricochet, and to
separate and protect the identities of the witnesses.
Execution Procedures, supra note 234.
241. One of the more documented accounts comes from Christopher Cutler. See Cutler,
supra note 32, at 363–64.
242. See Execution Procedures, supra note 234.
243. Nate Carlisle, Firing Squad: An Eyewitness Account of Gardner’s Execution, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE (Jan. 18, 2016), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/news/ci_15325356.
244. Cutler, supra note 32, at 363–64; Carlisle, supra note 244; Execution Procedures,
supra note 234. The Execution Procedures distributed at the time of the Ronnie Lee Gardner
firing squad execution in 2010 describe the set-up as follows.
FIRING SQUAD LOGISTICS
Executioners, pre-selected by the Department of Corrections, must be law-enforce-
ment certified in the State of Utah.  The five law enforcers remain anonymous, and
will be stationed behind a gun ported brick wall in the execution chamber.  The ex-
ecutioners will be armed with .30-caliber rifles, four of which will be loaded with live
rounds.  The weapon carrying the blank round will be unknown to the law enforcers.
The condemned will be secured to a chair, and a target will be placed over his
heart and a hood over his head.  At the conclusion of the condemned’s last words, the
execution team will commence fire.  A physician will be on site to certify that death
has occurred.
Execution Procedures, supra note 234.
245. Brady McCombs, Utah’s Firing Squad: How Does It Work?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/crime/5-questions-answered-how-do-firing-squads-work/
ar-AA9VcKI.
246. Cutler, supra note 32, at 364; McCombs, supra note 246.
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powered guns through the openings.247 The observation areas for
the witnesses are on the other two sides of the room.248 A doctor
then places a round white target on the inmate’s chest.249 There is
also a pan available that catches any blood that the inmate may
shed.250 After the firing squad team leader provides a countdown,
each member of the squad fires.251 According to Utah Representa-
tive Paul Ray, “[s]hooters aim for the chest rather than the head
because it’s a bigger target and usually allows for a faster death.”252
Regulations state that a physician certifies the inmate’s death.253
Early accounts of firing squad executions noted that the squad
was comprised of five volunteer marksmen, yet only four would re-
ceive rifles with live rounds.  A fifth rifle would contain a blank so
that no single member of the squad would experience personal
guilt for the killing.254  The Utah statute and regulations do not
state that this procedure is still followed and recent eyewitness ac-
counts do not mention this tradition. Yet the Utah State Prison’s
Execution Procedures specify that one of the “five law enforcers”
will have a rifle containing a blank round and that the Department
of Corrections “pre-select[s]” the executioners who “must be law-
enforcement certified” in the state.255
In 2015, a federal court judge denied an inmate’s Eighth Amend-
ment challenge to the constitutionality of Utah’s firing squad
without reviewing evidence about it.256  Regardless of the merits of
this particular challenge, it is regrettable that more is not known
about the effects of shooting on the human body.  That said, what is
available suggests that the method appears substantially more hu-
mane and reliable than this country’s other methods.
247. Cutler, supra note 32, at 363–64; Execution Procedures, supra note 234 (noting that
the guns are .30 caliber rifles); McCombs, supra note 246.
248. Carlisle, supra note 244.
249. Cutler, supra note 32, at 363–64; Carlisle, supra note 244; Execution Procedures,
supra note 234.
250. Cutler, supra note 32, at 364.
251. Id.
252. McCombs, supra note 246.
253. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-107-4 (4) (2015).
254. DRIMMER, supra note 203, at 91.
255. Execution Procedures, supra note 234.
256. See Lafferty v. Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-322, 2015 WL 6875393 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2015)
(dismissing inmates’ arguments that the firing squad is cruel and unusual); Utah: Challenging
Firing Squad Execution, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/
us/utah-judge-denies-appeal-challenging-firing-squad-execution.html?ref=us (discussing the
Lafferty challenge to the firing squad).
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C. Evidence of Pain or Problems
It is unclear whether a correctly-performed shooting is physically
painful.257 The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,258 for ex-
ample, considered the firing squad an inadequate method of
execution, concluding in one sentence that “it needs a multiplicity
of executioners and it does not possess even the first requisite of an
efficient method, the certainty of causing immediate death.”259
However, the Royal Commission, which was published in 1953,
never substantiated this determination; it also conflicts with evi-
dence that the firing squad is far more certain and humane that
other methods.260  In addition, when given a choice, inmates have
selected shooting over hanging, a pattern inconsistent with the
Royal Commission’s recommendation.261
More solid evidence suggests that a competently performed
shooting may lead to nearly instant death.  In 1938, in one unique
case of human “experimentation,” a Utah inmate condemned to
death for murder allowed doctors to conduct an electrocardio-
graph (ECG) tracing during his execution.262  The doctors attached
257. See Martin R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities—An Eighth Amendment Assessment of
Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96, 123 (1978) (“It is not certain
whether death by firing squad causes physical pain.”); Harold Hillman, The Possible Pain Exper-
ienced During Execution by Different Methods, 22 PERCEPTION 745, 745 (1993) (“It is difficult to
know how much pain the person being executed [by firing squad] feels or for how long,
because many of the signs of pain are obscured by the procedure or by physical restraints,
but one can identify those steps which are likely to be painful.”).  Books on this topic do not
discuss pain or physical suffering. See, e.g., VINCENT J.M. DI MAIO, GUNSHOT WOUNDS: PRACTI-
CAL ASPECTS OF FIREARMS, BALLISTICS, AND FORENSIC TECHNIQUES (1999) (providing no section
where pain is discussed in terms of physical suffering).
258. ROYAL COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949–53 REPORT 251 (1953) [hereinafter
ROYAL COMM’N REPORT].  In 1949, the Queen of England appointed 12 individuals
[t]o consider and report whether liability under the criminal law in Great Britain to
suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited or modified, and if so, to what
extent and by what means, for how long and under what conditions persons who
would otherwise have been liable to suffer capital punishment should be detained,
and what changes in the existing law and the prison system would be required; and to
inquire into and take account of the position in those countries whose experience and
practice may throw light on these questions.
Id. at iii. To this day, the Royal Commission’s report is cited as solid authority on methods of
execution. See, e.g., THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 47, at 5, 16, 22, 287, 315, 378;
FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA
11–12, 107–09 (1986).
259. ROYAL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 259.
260. See Khan & Leventhal, supra note 223, at 3; see supra notes 175–83 and accompanying
text and infra notes 258–77 and accompanying text.
261. DRIMMER, supra note 203, at 117.
262. GILLESPIE, supra note 234, at 117 (discussing Deering’s execution); Phillips H. Lord,
Public Guinea Pig No. 1, SCRIBNER’S COMMENTATOR, 94, 94–98 (1940) (depicting Deering’s life,
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the ECG wires to the inmate’s wrists and placed a small target over
his heart, which was beating at nearly three times the normal
rate.263  After the bullets hit the target, the inmate’s heartbeat
stopped 15.6 seconds later,264 yet he was not declared dead until
two-and-a-half minutes after the shooting.265 Likewise, Gary Gil-
more, who was executed in 1977, “quivered” after four bullets
entered his heart; he was pronounced dead two minutes later.266
In one of the most medically thorough examinations of execu-
tion methods, British scientist Harold Hillman concluded that the
firing squad had among the lowest levels of potential pain.267 Ac-
cording to Hillman, “[p]ersons hit by bullets feel as if they have
been punched—pain comes later if the victim survives long enough
to feel it.”268 He graded shooting as having either “little” to “moder-
ate” pain269 in contrast to hanging, electrocution, lethal gas, or even
beheading, all of which he classified as causing “severe” pain.270
Hillman acknowledged the Royal Commission’s brief dismissal of
the firing squad as a viable execution method; but he also noted
that “[t]hose giving evidence to the Commission frequently empha-
sized their belief that any method of execution that they
recommended should be rapid, clean, and dignified.”271  The firing
squad, on the other hand, can be considered “messy.”272
There are experts, however, who would think lethal injection is
far messier.  Jonathan Groner, a pediatric and trauma surgeon, has,
for over a decade, examined lethal injection cases and frequently
testified in federal and state courts about the method’s physical
brutality.273 He has also handled gunshot wound cases.274 He con-
tends that death by firing squad “‘probably happens within
crime, and death); Gladys Hobbs, Science Benefits by Execution of Deering, DESERET NEWS (Salt
Lake City), Oct. 31, 1938, at 3 (describing details of the Deering execution); Slayer’s Heart
Triples Beat As He Faces Death, CHIC. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 1, 1938, at 8 [hereafter Slayer’s Heart]
(noting that the electrocardiograph of Deering’s heart was “the first ever made of a man’s
heart as bullets pierced it”).
263. Lord, supra note 263, at 97–98; Hobbs, supra note 263; Slayer’s Heart, supra note 263.
264. Slayer’s Heart, supra note 263.
265. Hobbs, supra note 263.
266. DRIMMER, supra note 203, at 119.
267. See HILLMAN, supra note 258, at 750.
268. Id. at 745.
269. Id. at 749–50.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 745.
272. See supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text.
273. Josh Sanburn, The Harsh Reality of Execution by Firing Squad, TIME (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://time.com/3742818/utah-firing-squad-execution-lethal-injection/; Telephone Inter-
view with Jonathan I. Groner, M.D., Interim Chief of the Department of Pediatric Surgery
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seconds.’”275 While “‘[t]here is no way to measure the pain . . .
there’s anecdotal evidence that ‘it is less painful.’”276
An incompetently-performed shooting may well cause acute
pain,277 however rare such instances may be.  Of the 144 civilian
firing squad executions that have been recorded,278 only two—the
executions of Wallace Wilkerson and Eliseo Mares—had any re-
ported problems.279 Wilkerson’s 1877 execution departed from the
normal procedure in ways that would not occur today. Not only
were there reports that he may have been intoxicated,280 but he re-
fused to be tied to a chair or blindfolded and thus displaced the
paper target pinned to his jacket when he flinched.281 Three bullets
hit the paper target, which had shifted to an inch above his heart,
while a fourth bullet hit his left arm above his heart.282 Reports esti-
mate that Wilkerson took between fifteen and twenty minutes to
die; officials considered having executioners shoot him again but
he passed away before they made the decision.283  Mares’s 1951 exe-
cution also went awry;284 all four executioners shot bullets into the
wrong side of Mares’s chest, apparently intentionally, and he bled
to death.285
Again, such issues would not exist today; the firing squad is far
more transparent than other execution methods and such signs of
intentional misses would be clearer.  Expert markspersons, situated
so closely to the inmate, would be firmly secured and would not
miss such a bold target on an inmate’s heart unless the miss was
deliberate.
and Trauma Medical Director of the Level 1 Trauma Program at Nationwide Children’s Hos-
pital and a Professor of Clinical Surgery at The Ohio State University College of Medicine
(Aug. 15, 2015).
274. Telephone Interview with Jonathan I. Groner, supra note 274.
275. Sanburn, supra note 274; Telephone Interview with Jonathan I. Groner, supra note
274.
276. Sanburn, supra note 274.
277. Gardner, supra note 258, at 123–24; Roberta Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney: Ana-
lyzing the (Unconstitutionality) of the Methods of Execution, 6 PUB. INT. L.J. 153, 170–71 (1996).
278. See supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text.
279. See Cutler, supra note 32, at 346–47, 356–57, 413.
280. See id. at 346.
281. See id. at 346–47.
282. GILLESPIE, supra note 234, at 49.
283. GILLESPIE, supra note 234, at 49; Cutler, supra note 32, at 346–67.
284. GILLESPIE, supra note 234, at 127–29.
285. Id. at 129.
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D. Blood Atonement and Image
Since 1976, there have been only three firing squad executions,
all in Utah: Gary Gilmore in 1977, John Albert Taylor in 1996, and
Ronnie Lee Gardner in 2010.286 According to the Utah Department
of Corrections, the current (2016) Execution Policy is “under re-
view,” and the Department “anticipate[s] being able to put a public
version of it on the Department’s Web site in the near future.”287
Discussion regarding the state’s firing squad procedure and the
public reaction to it is thus both limited and dated. The history of
the firing squad, however, can provide some perspective for how
the method may be viewed today.
A number of scholars have traced the use of the firing squad in
Utah to the Mormon religion’s concept of “blood atonement.”288
Blood atonement is the historical Mormon idea that Jesus Christ
spilled his blood for Christians’ sins; in turn, some sinners are so
heinous that, like Christ, they must shed their own blood to achieve
a degree of forgiveness “in the next life.”289 Utah is unique in both
its distinct Mormon heritage and its use of an execution method
that actually “spills” blood.290
286. See Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/views-executions (last visited May 4, 2016).
287. Letter from Gina Proctor, Records Manager, Utah Dep’t of Corr.—Admin. Services
Bureau, to author (Feb. 4, 2016) (on file with author).
288. See infra notes 289–97 and accompanying text.
289. GILLESPIE, supra note 234, at 12–13; Martin R. Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation As
a Sufficient Condition for Unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause—A Case for Considera-
tion: The Utah Firing Squad, WASH. U. L. REV. 435, 440, 442 (1979).
290. GILLESPIE, supra note 234, at 12–13 (describing the evolution of the Mormon belief
in “blood atonement,” which proposes that “only through choosing a method of execution
which results in blood being ‘spilled’ (or shed) can the condemned hope to receive forgive-
ness in the next life”); see also Gardner, supra note 290, at 440 (discussing blood atonement).
Starting in 1851, when Utah (before statehood) enacted its first capital punishment statute,
those found guilty of murder were to be executed by way of “firing squad, hanging, or be-
heading at the court’s or condemned’s election.” 1852 Utah Terr. Laws tit. XII, pp. 142–43
§ 125 (“General Definition and Provision as to Crimes and Offenses”) (Mar. 6, 1852) (firing
squad, hanging, or beheading at the court’s or condemned’s election).  In 1898, Utah passed
a capital punishment statute authorizing execution by firing squad or hanging, but not be-
heading, and allowing the defendant a choice of methods. Utah Rev. Stat. § 4939 (1898)
(firing squad or hanging at the condemned’s election; court’s choice if the condemned fails
to choose a method). Only two men elected to be hanged under the 1898 statute. See BOW-
ERS, PIERCE & MCDEVITT, supra note 44, at 13 n.h. (1984).  If the defendant did not choose,
the statute authorized the courts to decide the method of execution.  It appears that Utah
was the first state to give the condemned a choice of method of execution. GILLESPIE, supra
note 234, at 12.
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While the Mormon Church officially rejected the doctrine of
blood atonement in 1978,291 media fingers still point to the doc-
trine at the time of firing squad executions.  A prime example is
John Albert Taylor’s highly publicized choice in 1996 to be exe-
cuted by firing squad under what was then Utah’s statute allowing
inmates to choose between lethal injection and the firing squad.292
While Taylor’s motivations for choosing the firing squad were un-
clear, the media interpreted them as an effort to embarrass the
state and its connection to archaic Mormon beliefs.293  Taylor’s
choice also spotlighted some of the challenges in administering the
firing squad: the building of a viable execution chamber; devising a
means to catch the inmate’s blood in a safe and hygienic manner;
countering the method’s perceived brutality.294  For example, the
Utah State Corrections Department spokesperson at the time of
Taylor’s execution stated that the firing squad was no “more grue-
some than the more modern techniques we use.”295 Yet he
conceded that the method had an image problem: “[t]he public
views lethal injections as less violent and more professional.”296
Even in 1996, however, studies showed that the firing squad causes
death faster than lethal injection.297
Regardless of any perceived link to blood atonement, opposition
to the firing squad as an execution method seems to be based
mainly on its image rather than on the procedure’s humaneness.
Utah used the firing squad as the only method of execution for just
two years.298 In 1983, Utah joined other states by allowing the con-
demned inmate a choice between two methods. In Utah, the choice
was either the firing squad or lethal injection, with lethal injection
291. Gardner, supra note 290, at 448.
292. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31, at 395; see also 1983 Utah Laws 112 § 1 (the
Utah statute in effect in 1996; firing squad or lethal injection at the condemned’s election;
lethal injection if the condemned fails to choose a method); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5
(1953) (amended 1984). The 1983 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation.
293. Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31, at 395; James Brooke, Utah Hopes Next Execu-
tion Will Be Last by Firing Squad, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Jan. 14, 1996, at A21; Nora McCarthy, All
Ready to Kill / Utah Gets Calls for Firing Squad Volunteers, NEWSDAY (New York), Jan. 16, 1996, at
A07.
294. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31, at 395 nn.462–63; see also Brian McGrory, A
Time of Executions; Firing Squad, Hanging Bring Issue to Forefront, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1996,
at A1; Brad Knickerbocker, Death by Firing Squad Under the Gun, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Jan. 25, 1996, at 4; Ian Katz, US Revives Firing Squad’s Dying Art, GUARDIAN, Jan. 25, 1996, at 2.
295. McCarthy, supra note 294, at A07.
296. Id.
297. Knickerbocker, supra note 295, at 4.
298. 1980 Utah Laws 15 § 2 (firing squad). The 1980 law did not expressly indicate retro-
active operation.
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as the fallback if the inmate did not choose.299 Controversy over the
firing squad’s purported “barbarity,” however, prompted the Utah
legislature to drop it in 2004 in favor of lethal injection.300 Yet, little
more than a decade later, the state brought the firing squad back
again (in 2015) as a substitute execution method when certain con-
ditions were met.301 Thus, practicality trumped perceived barbarity
in light of the state’s concern that it may not be able to access lethal
injection drugs.
In the context of execution methods, such exceptions to the
norm can be enlightening.  Since 1900, for example, all firing
squad executions have taken place in Utah except for one, which
occurred in Nevada.302 For eight years—between 1912 and 1920—
Nevada allowed inmates to choose between firing squad and hang-
ing as an alternative.303  During that period, only one defendant—
Andrija Mircovich in 1912—chose the firing squad.304 Because sev-
eral guards balked at carrying out a sentence they thought
resembled cold-blooded murder, marksmen from all over the world
wrote to Nevada’s warden to volunteer their efforts.305 The warden
tried to convince Mircovich to consent to hanging, yet he refused.
Mircovich was finally killed by a 1000-pound execution machine
that fired three mounted rifles upon the cutting of three strings,
only two of which fired the weapons with real bullets.306  Thus, the
299. 1983 Utah Laws 112 § 1 (firing squad or lethal injection at the condemned’s elec-
tion; lethal injection if the condemned fails to choose a method); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
5.5 (1953) (amended 1984). The 1983 law did not expressly indicate retroactive operation.
300. H.B. 180, 60th Leg, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014) (removing the right of the condemned
to choose the method of execution and leaving lethal injection as the only remaining option
in the state).
301. On March 23, 2015, Utah Governor Gary Herbert signed legislation reauthorizing
the state to use the firing squad in the event that the drugs required for lethal injection are
unavailable. Before this move, the firing squad was an option, but was only allowed for in-
mates who chose this method prior to its elimination in 2004.  H.B. 11, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Utah 2015).
302. Cutler, supra note 32, at 400.
303. Nev. Rev. Stat. p. 2039 § 7281 (1912) (hanging or firing squad at the condemned’s
election; the court’s choice if the condemned fails to choose a method). The 1912 law did
not expressly indicate retroactive operation. Before 1912, hanging was the only option. Nev.
Gen. Stat. Ann. 21 § 4348 (1885).
304. Phillip I. Earl, By the Knife: Tonopah’s Gregovich-Mircovich Murder Case, in HISTORY AND
HUMANITIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILBUR S. SHEPPERSON 15, 35–38 (Frances X. Hartigan ed.,
1989) [hereinafter Earl, By the Knife]; Phillip I. Earl, Nevada’s Execution Machine, THE
NEVADAN, Dec. 3, 1972, at 3 [hereinafter Nevada’s Machine]; see also CHRISTIANSON, supra note
40, at 62 (describing Mircovich’s execution).  The spelling of Mircovich’s name varies de-
pending on the source. See Earl, Nevada’s Execution Machine, supra, at 3 (“Andrija
Mirkovitch”), Earl, By the Knife, supra, at 18 (“Andrija Mircovich”), and Christianson, supra, at
62 (“Andriza Mircovich”).
305. See Earl, Nevada’s Execution Machine, supra note 305, at 3; Earl, By the Knife, supra note
305, at 30–31.
306. See Earl, Nevada’s Execution Machine, supra note 305, at 3.
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three “executioners” never even had to see their victim.307  Al-
though the machine performed successfully, it was never used
again.308 In 1921, Nevada became the first state to enact lethal gas309
in an effort to provide a more humane method of execution.310
Ironically lethal gas would become the most inhumane method of
execution that any state has adopted.311
E. A Balanced View
Of all the execution methods in this country, perceptions and
application of the firing squad are among the most contradictory.
On the one hand, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the
firing squad is the most humane method of execution. In Justice
Sotomayor’s words, it is “more reliable” as well as “relatively quick
and painless.”312 For example, there is a consensus that Gary Gil-
more’s 1977 execution was swift, dignified, and consistent with
protocol.313 The same can be said of the execution of Albert Lee
Taylor nearly twenty years later. According to a corrections official
who observed Taylor’s execution, Utah’s firing squad procedure
“was carried out in as dignified a manner as [he had] ever wit-
nessed.”314 In addition, a Salt Lake Tribune reporter’s description of
the 2010 execution of Ronnie Lee Gardner found the scene more
pristine and removed than he might have predicted. “Firing four
bullets into a man’s chest is, by definition, violent.  If it can also be
clinical and sterile, then that also happened in this execution.”315
This same reporter never saw blood, which seemed to pool instead
under Gardner’s shirt. While the reporter could not tell what Gard-
ner was feeling or if he experienced pain, in his view this was not a
“messy” execution.316
307. See id.
308. See id.; Earl, By the Knife, supra note 305, at 38.
309. 1921 Nev. Stat. 246 § 1 (lethal gas). In 1921, in an attempt to prove the state hu-
mane, the Nevada legislature passed a law providing that lethal gas was to be administered
“without warning and while (the inmate was) asleep in his cell.” BOWERS, PIERCE & MCDEV-
ITT, supra note 44, at 12. This procedure was never followed, however, because it was
impossible to release the gas in a regular cell. Id.  For a masterful discussion of the history
and development of lethal gas and its use, see CHRISTIANSON, supra note 305.
310. See generally CHRISTIANSON, supra note 40; Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31.
311. See generally CHRISTIANSON, supra note 40; Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 31.
312. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2796 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
313. Cutler, supra note 32, at 362.
314. Mike Carter, Bill Voiding Firing-Squad Option Dropped, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 10,
1996, at E3.
315. Carlisle, supra note 244.
316. Id.
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Of course, Judge Kozinski’s “messy”317 reference goes beyond
simply the spilling of blood.  Rather, Judge Kozinski hones the
point that we should also have a method that treats the firing squad
as a true punishment, rather than a medical illusion: “[i]f we, as a
society, cannot stomach the splatter from an execution carried out
by firing squad, then we shouldn’t be carrying out executions at
all.”318  Together with the evidence of the firing squad’s greater hu-
maneness and sterility, this view balances Justice Sotomayor’s
concern that the firing squad “could be seen as a devolution to a
more primitive era,”319 or a mark of “visible brutality” prompting
Eighth Amendment arguments.320
Firing squad executions occur rarely. Some of the most accessi-
ble information derives from eyewitness accounts and historical
anecdotes. That said, the consensus of opinion concerning firing
squads comports with Justice Sotomayor’s argument that they are
swift and relatively pain free. While “image” may be a factor discour-
aging the use of firing squads, one can question lethal injection’s
image as well, at which point lethal injection’s pretense of medical
veneer can seem far more “primitive” than a pistol.
IV. CONCLUSION
Glossip v. Gross321 is the second time in seven years that the Su-
preme Court has had to step in to validate a state’s lethal injection
procedure. One of Glossip’s more controversial mandates, however,
is the Court’s two-part test that requires petitioners to “establish
both that [a state’s] lethal injection protocol creates a demon-
strated risk of severe pain and that the risk is substantial when
compared to known and available alternatives.”322 As for the test’s
first part, there is a substantial literature contending that lethal in-
jection protocols, of various sorts and combinations, “create[ ] a
demonstrated risk of severe pain,”323 and Oklahoma’s protocol is
317. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
318. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014).  One reporter interviewing
Judge Kozinski asked him if he was being serious about his recommendation of the firing
squad.  He replied that he “was quite serious,” referring to all the problems with lethal injec-
tion drugs.  See Patt Morrison, Judge Alex Kozinski on Bringing Back Firing Squads: “No, I Wasn’t
Kidding”, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0731-mor-
rison-kozinski-20140729-column.html.  Robert Blecker has also advocated for the firing squad
on a range of levels.  For a particularly eloquent discussion, see BLECKER, supra note 32.
319. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2796 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 2797.
321. Id. at 2726.
322. Id.
323. See supra notes 106–54 and accompanying text.
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no exception.324 This Article focuses on the second part of the test
concerning “a known and available alternative.” The discussion sug-
gests that the firing squad, when compared to lethal injection, is the
clear winner, as measured by speed, certainty, and humaneness. Al-
though the firing squad appears saddled with a distinct image
problem, respected jurists and public opinion are increasingly com-
ing to its reputational rescue while also pointing to the disastrous
experiment that lethal injection has become.
324. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
